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CONSENT, EXIT, AND THE CONTRACf MODEL OF 
THE CORPORATION - A COMMENTARY ON 
MARYLAND'S NEW DIRECfOR AND OFFICER 
LIABILITY LIMITING AND 
INDEMNIFICATION LEGISLATION 
Dennis R. Honabacht 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 18, 1988 the Maryland General Assembly adopted 
amendments to Maryland's General Corporations Law placing Mary-
land among the leaders in the ongoing revolution to restate and reformu-
late the fiduciary duty of corporate officers and directors. 1 The new 
provisions allow shareholders to "opt out" of the current rules imposing 
monetary liability on directors and officers in a wide_range of cases.2 In 
addition, they authorize the corporation to offer greatly expanded indem-
nification to officers and directors. 3 Because the new provisions enhance 
the ability of Maryland corporations to shelter their directors and officers 
from personal liability, they undoubtedly will be warmly received in both 
the boardroom and the executive suite.4 
A warm reception by their most obvious beneficiaries, however, does 
little to answer the important question of whether the new provisions 
constitute an improvement over the prior corporate governance rules. 
Some commentators believe they are not. These critics argue that by 
reducing the role liability rules play in regulating corporate fiduciaries, 
the new legislation eliminates crucial protection for shareholders. 5 They 
condemn the wave of legislation reformulating corporate fiduciary duties, 
characterizing it as merely another example of the power of corporate 
directors and officers to extract concessions from state legislatures; as yet 
t Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden School of Law. The au-
thor wishes to thank Professors Roger Dennis, Patrick Ryan, Mark Sargent, and 
Mark Steinberg for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The normal caveats apply. 
1. Act of Feb. 18, 1988, ch. 3, 1988 Md. Laws 739. For a general discussion of the 
new legislation in all states, see Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of 
the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 13 (1988); Hanks, Evaluating Recent State 
Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 
Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988). 
2. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). 
3. See /d. § 2-418 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
4. See Hanks & Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the Maryland Di-
rector and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 235 (1989) 
(describing response of Maryland chartered publicly-owned corporations to the pas-
sage of the new legislation). 
5. See Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute, 18 
U. BALT. L. REV. 278 (1989); Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 
Sw. L. J. 919 (1988); see also Zwier, Is the Maryland Director and Officer Liability 
Statute Based on a Male-Oriented Ethical Model?, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 368 (1989). 
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"another lap in the race to the bottom. "6 
The drafters of the new legislation naturally view their efforts quite 
differently. Though they admit that the new provisions diminish the role 
liability rules play in structuring the relationship between shareholders 
and their directors and officers, the drafters do not believe the new provi-
sions unduly favor directors and officers. Instead, as they noted in their 
report to the Maryland State Bar Association's Section of Corporation, 
Banking and Business Law/ the drafters believe that several rationales 
justify the new legislation. They contend that the new provisions are 
"fair" to corporate directors and officers;8 that they promote the eco-
nomic well-being of the state;9 and that they empower shareholders, the 
owners ofa corporation, to privately order their own relations with their 
directors and officers. 10 The new legislation may lead to increased discre-
tion for directors and officers, the drafters admit, but for good reasons. 
This article undertakes a five-part critique of the new legislation. 
Part II summarizes the new provisions and explains their significance. 
Part III examines each of the drafters' justifications, concluding that only 
the shareholder empowerment justification has a serious claim of legiti-
macy. Part IV analyzes the central portions of the new provisions in 
light of the empowerment justification. It demonstrates that although 
the new provisions afford shareholders some power to vary traditional 
liability rules, they restrict that power in important ways that are incon-
sistent with the goal of empowering shareholders. Moreover, it demon-
strates that the new indemnification provisions inexplicably permit 
corporate directors to override shareholder intent. Part IV concludes 
that the new provisions cannot be justified by a simple invocation of 
shareholder empowerment norms. 
The inadequacy of the justifications for the new provisions proffered 
by the drafters, however, does not compel the conclusion that the provi-
sions are inappropriate. Part V considers a different but related defense 
of the new provisions. Analyzing them in light of the emerging Contract 
Model of the corporation, it argues that.the new provisions may be con-
sistent with at least the "strong" or neo-classical form of that Model, 11 
6. Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom - The Second 
Lap, 66 N.C.L. REv. 171 (1987); Steinberg, supra note 5, at 924. 
7. MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N SEC. OF CORP., BANKING AND Bus. L., COMM. ON 
CORP. LAW, SUBCOMM. ON DIRECTOR LIABILITY REP. (Nov. 16, 1987), reprinted 
in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 254 (1989) (Appendix) [hereinafter DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
REPORT]; see also Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4. 
8. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT at 16-17, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 262-
63; see also infra text accompanying notes 58-69. 
9. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 17, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. 
REV. at 263; see also infra text accompanying notes 70-82. 
10. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 16, reprinted in U. BALT. L. REV. 
at 262; see also infra text accompanying notes 83-120. 
11. For a description of the "strong" or neoclassical form of the Contract Model, see 
infra note 130. 
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but only so long as they are applied to "open corporations." 12 Because 
shareholders of open corporations who oppose the modification of their 
corporate contract provisions can "exit" by selling their shares, their fail-
ure to exit implies consent to the new regime. 13 Unfortunately, at least 
from the view point of one who would invoke the Contract Model to 
justify them, the new provisions, however, do not apply only to open 
corporations. As Part V demonstrates, indiscriminate application of the 
new provisions to all Maryland corporations is inconsistent with the 
Contract Model, for it may work a midstream modification of the fiduci-
ary rules of corporations •.vhose shareholders cannot exit if they object, 
and who therefore cannot be deemed to have consented to the new provi-
sions merely because they continue to hold their shares. Part VI pro-
poses changes in the structuring of the new provisions which, if adopted, 
might align them more closely with the requirements of the Contract 
Model by assuring that they apply only to shareholders who explicitly or 
implicitly consent to their application. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW PROVISIONS 
As the Subcommittee recognized, the new provisions may effect a 
substantial change in the fiduciary rules applicable to corporate directors 
and officers. 14 That change, however, is likely to be significant only in a 
limited context. Until quite recently, the directors and officers of Mary-
land corporations were nominally subject to a duty of loyalty and a duty 
of care which required essentially that they act (1) in good faith, (2) in 
the best interest of the corporation, and (3) with the care of an ordinary 
person under similar circumstances. 15 Because the co~rts readily em-
ployed the Business Judgment Rule 16 to decline review of most manage-
12. For a definition of "open corporation" as used in this article, see infra note 170. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 171-174. 
14. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 16-19, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. 
REv. at 262-64. 
15. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1(a) (Supp. 1988). 
16. The Business Judgment Rule provides that directors and officers of corporations are 
not liable for the unfavorable outcomes of their decisions so long as they had a 
rational business purpose for their decisions. Generally, the rule shields both the 
decision and the decision maker from judicial review so long as the decision maker 
(1) was not interested in the decision, (2) adequately informed himself to the extent 
he reasonably believed appropriate, and (3) rationally believed his decision was in 
the best interest of the corporation. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 4.01(c) (Tent. Draft No.4, Apr. 12, 
1985) [hereinafter ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS). For a discussion of the 
ALI project, see Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, The Corporate Gov-
ernance Debate and The ALI Proposals: Reform or Restatement?, 40 V AND. L. REV. 
693 (1987) [hereinafter Special Project, Debate); see also E. BRODSKY & M. ADAM-
SKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIA-
BILITIES, ch. 2 (1984 & Supp. 1988); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 
8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, An 
Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1987) [hereinafter Special Project, Histori-
cal Perspective]; Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, Recent Develop-
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rial behavior in which no self-dealing was alleged, directors and officers 
had little real reason to fear that they might actually incur personal lia-
bility simply because they might have failed to exercise adequate care. 
Indeed, they were likely to be held personally liable to the corporation 
only if they were disloyaP 7 or grossly negligent. 18 In that respect, direc-
tors and officers fared no better or worse than their counterparts in other 
states. 19 As one commentator has described it, searching for cases im-
posing liability on directors and officers for failing to exercise due care 
has always been much like searching "for a very small number of needles 
in a very large haystack. "20 
The comfortableness of Maryland's directors and officers, however, 
was ended abruptly in the mid-1980's by three related events. First, lead-
ing corporate courts suddenly and dramatically expressed both a re-
newed interest in evaluating the process (as opposed to the substance) of 
the management's decision making, and a willingness to impose personal 
liability on directors and officers if they found that process wanting. 21 
Second, the highly publicized wave of hostile takeovers continued, forc-
ing more and more directors and officers to take action designed to pro-
ments Concerning the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment 
Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1987) [hereinafter Special Project: Director and Of-
ficer Liability, Recent Developments]. For a decidedly unflattering view of the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, see Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1277 (1984). 
17. See, e.g., Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 498 A.2d 642 (1985); 
Chesapeake Constr. Co. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970). See gener-
ally Miller, The Fiduciary Duties of a Corporate Director, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 
(1975). 
18. See, e.g., Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d 605 (1971); Parish v. Maryland 
& Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968). See generally 
Miller, supra note 17. 
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) ("[D]irector Liabil-
ity is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence."). The origins of the gross neg-
ligence standard can be traced at least as far back as the decision in Percy v. 
Millaudon, 8 Mart. 68 (La. 1892). For an overview of the negligence standard as 
applied to corporate fiduciaries, see Special Project, Historical Perspective, supra 
note 16, at 614-615. 
20. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Cor-
porate Directors & Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1099 (1968); see also Comment, 
Director Liability Under the Business Judgement Rule: Fact or Fiction, 35 Sw. L.J. 
775 (1981). 
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme 
Court presaged its decision in Van Gorkom in Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 
316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), a.lf'd per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974). In Gimbel, 
however, plaintiff shareholders sought to enjoin a transaction they claimed was the 
product of hasty decision making, not to impose personal liability. For hostile reac-
tions to Van Gorkom, see Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union 
Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 1437 (1985); Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Busi-
ness of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187 (1986); Manning, Life in the 
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1986). But see Prickett, An Expla-
nation of Trans Union to "Henny Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 
(1985) (arguing Van Gorkom was correctly decided). 
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teet the corporation · from unwanted suitors. 22 Such action requires 
directors and officers to make decisions which may significantly affect the 
corporation's value but which vary from the pattern of "ongoing business 
decisions" routinely protected by the Business Judgment Rule. 23 Finally, 
the so-called "liability insurance crisis" forced corporations to pay dra-
matically higher premiums for directors' and officers' liability insurance 
(if they were able to purchase it at all). 24 The combination of these 
events apparently so threatened corporate directors that many expressed 
an unwillingness to serve unless they were assured protection from liabil-
ity.25 Not surprisingly, corporate leaders clamored for legislative relief. 
The Maryland General Assembly, like many other state legislatures,26 
responded affirmatively. 27 
The recent amendments to the Maryland General Corporations Law 
consist of two sets of provisions designed to alleviate the liability fears of 
directors and officers. The first, whiCh is patterned on a similar provision 
22. For an overview of hostile takeover activity and legislative responses, see Romano, 
The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislative and Public Opinion, 57 U. CINN. L. 
REV. 457 (1988). 
23. At least one rationale for the Business Judgment Rule is that in appointing directors 
(and through the directors, the officers), shareholders have expressed confidence in 
directors' and officers' business acumen, at least as to decisions relating to ongoing 
business matters. Accordingly, the courts interfere only reluctantly with decision-
making by the shareholders' chosen managers, because doing so would require them 
to second-guess the managers and would involve them in frequent disputes over 
day-to-day matters. When the decisions before the board involve structural rather 
than operational matters, however, the courts are less reluctant to intervene. See, 
e.g., Unocal Corp. y. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (board of 
directors must demonstrate that its response to a hostile bid was reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed by the bid). The courts appear to recognize that reviewing 
structural decisions need not involve them in an ongoing review of day-to-day busi-
ness operations. Moreover, doing so does not require them to displace decision 
makers chosen by shareholders, because shareholders have not necessarily expressed 
confidence in management's ability to make structural decisions. See GILSON, THE 
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 573-580 (1986); Note, False 
Halo: The Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Control Transactions, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 843 (1988) [hereinafter Note, False Halo]. 
Other reasons offered in support of the rule include: (1) imposing liability on 
directors and officers would deter qualified individuals from serving in those posi-
tions; (2) shareholders "assume" the risk of poor management; (3) retrospective re-
view may result in the judge or jury mistaking bad luck for bad judgment; and (4) 
the threat of liability may deter directors and officers from undertaking desirable 
risks. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance 
Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1984). 
24. See Hanks, supra note 1, at 1208-09; Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 235; see 
also DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-5, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. 
L. REV. at 255-56. 
25. See DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. 
REv. at 257. 
26. For a complete listing of the various state acts, see Hanks, supra note 1, at 1246-
1253. 
27. For an extensive review of the legislative history of Maryland's new provisions, see 
Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 238-45. 
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in the Delaware code,28 permits shareholders to "opt out" of many of the 
current rules that impose monetary liability on corporate directors and 
officers. 29 The second liberalizes the rules governing the power of a 
Maryland corporation to indemnify its directors and officers. 30 The 
drafters apparently assume that shareholders will use the power granted 
them by the new rules to eliminate liability to the fullest extent permitted 
by law. 31 
The first set of provisions permits shareholders to adopt a corporate 
charter provision expanding or limiting the liability of the corporation's 
directors and officers for money damages in a wide range of cases. 32 
These provisions, however, do not grant shareholders carte blanche. The 
new provisions prohibit shareholders from limiting directors' or officers' 
liability to the corporation or its shareholders in any of three situations: 
when a director or officer has actually received an improper benefit or 
profit in money, property, or services, for the amount of the benefit or 
profit in money, property, or services actually received;33 when a direc-
tor's or officer's action or inaction is the result of active and deliberate 
dishonesty;34 or when a director's or officer's actions arise out of certain 
specified banking transactions. 35 More importantly, the new provisions 
do not permit shareholders to modify the director's or officer's underly-
ing duty to the corporation. 36 Their duty is still to act in good faith and 
in the manner of a reasonable person in a like situation under similar 
circumstances. 37 Consequently, a liability-limiting charter provision that 
is adopted pursuant to the new provisions will have no effect on a direc-
tor's or officer's liability in equity. 38 Moreover, such a provision will not 
28. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). Maryland's "charter option" 
provision differs significantly in that it applies to officers as well as directors, and 
does not contain a broad "duty of loyalty" exclusion. Mo. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns ConE 
ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). For a discussion of Maryland's exclusions, see infra 
text accompanying notes 33-40. For a comparison of the two provisions, see Hanks, 
supra note 1, at 1210-16; Sargent, supra note 5, at 280-82. 
29. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). 
30. /d. § 2-418 (Supp. 1988). 
31. See, e.g., Hanks, Forms- Liability of Directors and Officers (Proposed Article First), 
reprinted in M. SARGENT, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY TODAY 81 
(MICPEL 1988): 
To the maximum extent that Maryland law in effect from time to time 
permits limitation of the liability of directors and officers, no director or 
officer of the Corporation shall be liable to the Corporation or its stock-
holders for money damages. 
The preliminary corporate reaction to the new provisions supports the drafters' as-
sumption. See Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4. 
32. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). 
33. /d. § 2-405.2(a)(1). 
34. /d. § 2-405.2(a)(2). 
35. /d. §§ 2-405.2(a)(3), 2-405.2(b). 
36. Compare id. with VA. ConE ANN. § 13.1-609(A)(1985) ("a director shall discharge 
his duties as a director ... in accordance with his good faith business judgment of 
the corporation."). 
37. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (Supp. 1988). 
38. See Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 246. 
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shield the decision itself from review. 39 Notwithstanding shareholder 
adoption of a liability-limiting charter amendment, a disgruntled share-
holder may still petition the courts to have action on the board's decision 
enjoined or rescinded. 40 
The second set of provisions significantly expands the ability of the 
corporation to indemnify corporate directors and officers and to advance 
monies to defer the expenses such individuals incur if they are sued.41 
Modeled on similar provisions in the Delaware General Corporation 
Law42 and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 43 the new pro-
visions permit a corporation to pay such indemnification unless it is 
proved that the defendant: (1) acted in bad faith or with active and delib-
erate dishonesty; (2) actually received an improper personal benefit in 
money, property, or services; or (3) engaged in criminal behavior with 
reasonable cause to believe that his act or omission was unlawful.44 The 
new provisions permit indemnification in a derivative action for actual 
expenses, judgments, penalties, fines, and, most importantly, amounts 
paid as settlements, so long as the defendant director or officer is not 
adjudged to be liable to the corporation.45 The provisions eliminate the 
prior rule that a termination of an action by a judgment, order, or settle-
ment creates a presumption that the individual failed to met the requisite 
standard of conduct.46 
The new indemnification provisions also permit the corporation to 
advance the defendant director reasonable expenses so long as the de-
39. In effect, the new liability limiting provisions strengthen the Business Judgment 
Rule while leaving the Business Judgment Doctrine untouched. For a discussion of 
the distinction between the Business Judgment Rule and Business Judgment Doc-
trine, see Hinsey, Business Judgement and the American Law Institute's Corporate 
Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 609 (1984). 
40. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), a./f'd per 
curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974). 
41. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (1985 & Supp. 1988). The new provi-
sions are applicable to corporate officers and agents unless otherwise provided in the 
corporation's charter. /d. § 2-418(j)(1) (1985). See generally Scriggins, 1988 
Amendments to the Maryland Indemnification Statute, reprinted in M. SARGENT, 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY TODAY (MICPEL 1988). 
42. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § l02(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). For discussions of Delaware's 
"charter option" provision, see Katz & Sherpo, From the Boardroom: Next to Last 
Word on Endangered Directors, 87 HARV. Bus. REV. 38 (Jan.-Feb. 1987); Schaffer, 
Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incorporation Shapes 
Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 665 (1987); Veasey, Finkelstein, & 
Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, 
Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987); Note, Limiting Directors 
Duty of Care Liability: An Analysis of Delaware's Charter Option Approach, 20 J. 
LAW REF. 543 (1987); Note, Delaware Amendment Relaxes Directors' Liability, 44 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. Ill (1987). 
43. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 8.50- 8.58 (1985). 
44. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418(b) (Supp. 1988). 
45. /d. § 2-418(b )(ii). 
46. /d. § 2-418(b)(3)(i). Compare id with. § 2-418(b)(3) (termination by ... settlement 
creates a rebuttable presumption that director did not meet the requisite standard). 
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fendant provides both a statement that he believes in good faith that he 
has met the standard of conduct required of him, and a written undertak-
ing to repay the amount advanced him should it ultimately be deter-
mined that he has not met that standard.47 In deciding whether to 
advance such expenses, the corporation need not determine whether the 
defendant can satisfy that undertaking should he be called upon to do 
so.4s 
Finally, the new indemnifications provisions explicitly provide that 
the corporate statute is not the exclusive source of the corporation's au-
thority to indemnify or advance expenses to defendant directors, officers, 
and agents.49 Expanded indemnification may be authorized by the cor-
poration's charter or bylaws, by shareholders' or directors' resolution, or 
by agreement. 50 
What effect will the new provisions have on the behavior of the di-
rectors and officers of Maryland's corporations? They are unlikely to 
alter significantly the behavior of directors and officers in ordinary busi-
ness activities; notwithstanding the recent clamor over liability, directors 
and officers have little reason to fear liability under the prior rules if they 
make a poor decision in a matter of routine business. 51 The provisions 
may have a significant impact, however, on the way directors and officers 
undertake action in extraordinary transactions (particularly in hostile 
takeover situations) where personal liability was previously a 'serious 
threat. 52 The natural inclination of directors and officers confronted with 
a takeover bid is to take measures to ward off the takeover. Under the 
prior rules, they rightly feared that seemingly hasty action-in particu-
lar, action which successfully thwarted the bid or closed off the auction 
in favor of a white knight-would result in a shareholder derivative suit 
seeking substantial damages. Under the new provisions, such a suit loses 
it sting. 53 Although the shareholder who successfully challenges the di-
47. /d. § 2-418(f)(l). 
48. /d. § 2-418(f)(2). 
49. /d. § 2-418(g). 
50. /d. 
51. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. The new rules may actually have 
been formulated to operate as a form of self-insurance. See Sargent, supra note 5, at 
293. The new rules may reduce the urge of directors to create a "paper trail" to 
document the reasonableness of the decision-making process. See id. at 286; see also 
Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van 
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW 1 (1985). 
52. Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23 WAKE FoREST L. 
REV. 1, 38 (1988); Honabach & Sargent, Directors' Liability Statutes Placed in Per-
spective, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1988, at 23-24; see also Note, False Halo, supra note 23 
(courts should repudiate application of the Business Judgment Rule in cases testing 
defensive takeover action by directors). 
53. Even if shareholders have not amended the corporation's charter to limit liability, 
directors and officers are generally assured that they can look to the corporation for 
an advancement of expenses, and later, for indemnification. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 105-120. See generally Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 
(1985 & Supp. 1988). 
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rectors' and officers' actions eventually might convince the court to order 
the dismantling of the defensive barricades, directors and officers need 
not fear personal liability. 54 
III. JUSTIFYING THE NEW PROVISIONS 
Because the new provisions will enhance the ability of directors and 
officers to undertake important and potentially self-serving actions with-
out fear of liability, they are certain to be criticized as a tool intended to 
permit corporate managers to entrench themselves at the expense of their 
shareholders. The drafters of the new provisions offer three quite differ-
ent rationales to support adoption of the new provisions: ( 1) the new 
provisions are "fairer" to corporate directors and officers because, if im-
plemented fully by the shareholders, they protect corporate directors and 
officers from unpredictable, excessive liability;55 (2) the new provisions 
are beneficial to the state because they eliminate an incentive for corpora-
tions to abandon Maryland and reincorporate elsewhere;56 and (3) the 
new provisions are desirable because they give shareholders, the owners 
of the corporation, the power to formulate their own governance rules. 57 
Because similar reasoning is often advanced to support legislation restat-
ing the fiduciary rules applicable to corporate directors and officers, it is 
worthwhile to examine, at least momentarily, each rationale. 
A. The Fairness Justification 
One· argument frequently made to justify enactment of provisions 
like the new Maryland amendments is that they are "fairer" to corporate 
directors and officers. That argument may be interpreted in either of two 
ways. One view is that it is unfair to subject corporate directors and 
officers to unpredictable, excessive liability on the basis of an after-the-
fact determination by a judge or jury that the directors and officers em-
ployed an inadequate decision-making process or otherwise failed to act 
with due care. 58 Such liability, the argument goes, is disproportionate to 
the rewards directors and officers receive for serving in their official ca-
pacities. 59 In particular, as the drafters of Maryland's new provisions 
noted, directors of publicly traded corporations often "are outsiders with 
54. Moreover, because time is the enemy of the bidder, the directors' and officers' adop-
tion of antitakeover measures may effectively thwart the takeover even though the 
court ultimately enjoins implementation of those measures. 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 58-69. 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 70-82. 
57. See infra text accompanying notes 83-120. 
58. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 
at 256-57. 
59. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 16, § 7.17, at 31 ("First and most 
fundamentally, a ceiling [on director and officer liability] is justified on grounds of 
fairness, because the potential liability . . . would be excessive in relation to the 
nature of the defendant's culpability and the economic benefits expected from serv-
ing the corporation."). 
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little or no equity investment ... in the corporation; yet they are charged 
with protecting the investment of [a large number] of stockholders .... 
Their compensation is insignificant relative to the magnitude of their 
risks and responsibilities."60 Implicit in the argument is the belief that 
liability for mismanagement-like criminal punishment-should some-
how "fit" the act. 
The premise of this fairness argument-that liability should be de-
pendent on compensation rather than on harm caused-is flawed. The 
compensation of a director (or officer) is irrelevant in assessing the fair-
ness of directors' and officers' liability so long as the rules for imposing 
liability are not amended ex post to impose personal liability for behavior 
which before hand was satisfactory.61 An individual who accepts a cor-
porate position does so knowing both the compensation and the responsi-
bility. If he believes that the threat of liability outweighs the 
compensation and perquisites of the position, he need only resign. By 
continuing to serve, he voluntarily subjects himself to the implicit terms 
of his agreement with the corporation, including the fiduciary rules im-
posed by the courts. Having freely made the decision to serve, he cannot 
complain that the threat of liability is onerous or unfair. 62 
The drafters' concern about the fairness of imposing liability on cor-
porate directors and officers may also be interpreted as concern not for 
60. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 18-19, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. 
REv. at 263-64. In their commentary, the drafters compared the potential liability 
of directors qua directors with the fees they receive for serving. Directors who are 
also officers, and non-officer directors (to whom the statute also applies) receive 
considerably greater compensation from the corporation. Nevertheless, their finan-
cial interest in the corporation is likely to be considerably less than the amount for 
which they might be held liable should they be found to have acted negligently in 
making a corporate decision which later turned bad. 
61. Although some commentators believed that Van Gorkom represented just such a 
change in the law, others believe that the decision was consistent with. prior law. 
Compare Fischel, supra note 21, with Prickett, supra note 21. At least one commen-
tator argues that the Van Gorkom court's emphasis on process offers directors and 
officers enhanced protection. See Sargent, supra note 5, at 291-92; see also Christy, 
Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate Man-
agers' Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21 Hous. L. REv. 104 (1984) (courts should 
review the process by which the defendant director or officer made her decision). 
But see Frug, supra note 16 (reliance on process review is inappropriate). 
62. A caveat is in order. The statement in the text assumes that a director or officer 
may resign without incurring a substantial penalty. In some cases that is not true. 
For example, if a director's or officer's compensation includes a substantial deferred 
compensation component which she would forfeit should she resign, she may be 
forced to continue serving in her official capacity even though she no longer desires 
to do so. Under such circumstances, she may not be deemed to have consented 
voluntarily to the changing fiduciary rules. Subjecting her to stricter liability rules 
would be an implicit breach of her agreement with the corporation. See Coffee, 
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 16-24 (1986). So long as exit is possible only at an extreme cost, one's failure to 
exit may signal either consent or recognition that the costs of exiting exceed the loss 
imposed by new contract terms. Cf Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism 
in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 
416-18 (1988). 
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the directors and officers themselves but rather for the corporation's 
shareholders. The drafters apparently feared that the increasing threat of 
liability might create a talent drain that eventually would harm the 
shareholders of Maryland's corporations. The drafters may have be-
lieved that reform was necessary to enable shareholders to retain mana-
gerial talent. 63 
The drafters' fear about shareholder welfare may not have been 
completely warranted for several reasons. First, as noted above, the 
threat of liability to directors and officers was significant under the prior 
rules only when they undertook a small (but important) set of deci-
sions. 64 If, nevertheless, shareholders and managers thought that threat 
too onerous, they could have devised private arrangements for permitting 
the directors and officers to act in those situations without risking per-
sonal liability. Action by the General Assembly may well have been un-
necessary. Second, even if some individuals were unwilling to serve as 
directors because they perceived an increased risk of liability,65 it is not 
clear that corporations were unable to fill their boards. Nor is there 
proof that the quality of corporate management would decline if board 
size were to be reduced. 66 Anecdotal evidence of "director flight" hardly 
63. The drafters referred repeatedly to their concern that the threat of liability would 
dissuade would-be directors from serving. See, e.g., DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 257 (Corporations will lose a 
vital source of independent thought and expertise and the remaining directors will 
inevitably tend toward caution and conservatism rather than innovation and the 
taking of sound business risks.); see also ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 16, § 7.17, at 31 (Given the frequently nominal investment of directors in their 
corporation's stock, a substantial risk of liability might lead risk-adverse directors to 
opt for more hesitant policies than shareholders desire (particularly to the extent 
that shareholders hold reasonably diversified portfolios and so are substantially pro-
tected from any firm-specific risk)). 
64. But see Sargent, supra note 5, at 294-95 (the perception of increased risk was suffi-
cient to alter directors' and officers' behavior in ways that were injurious to share-
holder welfare). 
65. See, e.g., Baum & Bryne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; 
Mallen & Evan, Surviving the Directors' and Officers' Liability Crisis: Insurance and 
the Alternatives, 12 DEL J. CORP. L. 439, 443-444 (1987); Selas, Risky Business: 
Corporate Directors Bail Out, 72 A.B.A. J., June l, 1986, at 24-25; Fowler, Scarce 
Corporate Directors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at 020. 
66. The threat of liability most affected the willingness of outside directors to serve. See 
Baum & Bryne, supra note 65. That development was viewed with alarm by many 
jurists, practitioners, and theorists who believe that outside directors perfor'm a val-
uable role in monitoring managerial behavior and injecting "outside" views into the 
debates about corporate activities. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE CORPORATION 149-170 (1976); Ruder, Protections for Corporate Shareholders: 
Are Major Revisions Needed?, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243, 261 (1988). To the extent 
that provisions like Maryland's limit the liability of such directors, more outside 
directors will be willing to serve. A substantial number of theorists, however, dis-
pute the claim that outside directors are effective agents. See, e.g., Brudney, The 
Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 
617-33 (1981); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 
1259, 1282-84 (1982). To the extent that this latter group of theorists is correct, the 
movement to limit director liability may represent misguided policy. 
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justifies a significant revision of fiduciary rules, rules that have evolved 
over time.67 
It is even less likely that many corporate officers were deterred from 
continuing to serve their corporations by the threat of increased personal 
liability. Given the size of their compensation and their investment of 
effort and time in acquiring managerial skills (many of which are firm 
specific),68 most officers likely would have found resignation much too 
expensive a response. Rather than abdicate their posts, they likely would 
have opted to negotiate increased salaries or perquisites, and would have 
sought to develop decisionmaking devices that shifted responsibility for 
crucial structural decisions to outside directors. 
Most importantly, if the drafters' frequently expressed concern for 
fairness reflected their concern for the well-being of shareholders, they 
presumably would have drafted legislation enabling shareholders to de-
cide whether to reduce fiduciary liability or expand indemnification. In-
stead, the new provisions only grant shareholders partial flexibility, and, 
as discussed below, they do not even ensure that shareholders-rather 
than corporate managers-decide which route to take. 69 
B. The Protectionism Justification 
At several points in their report, the drafters of the new provisions 
argue that the new rules are desirable because they benefit the state's 
economy.70 They contend that the new rules will eliminate the eagerness 
of Maryland corporations to reincorporate elsewhere to take advantage 
of more lenient liability rules. 71 Moreover, they assert, the new rules will 
establish Maryland's reputation as a state with a favorable business cli-
mate, and will even encourage foreign corporations to reincorporate in 
Maryland.72 The implicit premise of such statements is that Maryland 
and her citizens profit from having corporations incorporated in the 
state. 
The nexus between the economy of the state and the decision of 
corporations to incorporate in the state, however, is far from clear. 
Whether a corporation chooses to incorporate in Maryland or elsewhere 
does not directly affect that corporation's decision about where to locate 
its headquarters or plants. By way of example, Delaware is renowned for 
the number of leading firms incorporated there. 73 Yet relatively few of 
67. Cf Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporate Law: The ALI's 
Project and The Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557, 580-81 (1984). 
68. See Carney, supra note 62, at 416-18; Coffee, supra note 62, at 17-19. 
69. See infra notes 88-120 and accompanying text. 
70. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 11, 17, 20, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. 
L. REv. at 259, 263, 264-65. 
71. /d. at 31, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 271. 
72. /d. 
73. As of December 28, 1984, approximately forty-three percent of the corporations 
whose shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange were incorporated in 
Delaware. See Schaffer, supra note 42, at 65. 
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those corporations have any substantial operational or administrative 
presence in that state. 74 Though the drafters were correct to believe that 
in making "bricks and mortar" decisions, corporations care greatly about 
a state's "business climate", the "business climate" about which corpora-
tions are concerned is primarily a state's education, regulation, and taxa-
tion policies, not its corporate code.75 Moreover, because a corporation's 
decision about where to locate a plant has little to do with where it is 
incorporated, a change in the situs of incorporation of a corporation that 
has a substantial presence within the state of Maryland is unlikely to 
decrease the number of plants, jobs, and taxes it provides the state. Most 
Marylanders would scarcely notice its rein corporation elsewhere. 76 
It would overstate the objection to the drafters' comments to assert 
that a decision by a Maryland corporation to reincorporate elsewhere 
would have no direct impact whatsoever on Marylanders. At least two 
such effects should be identified. First, a decision by a Maryland corpo-
ration to reincorporate elsewhere would reduce the revenue that corpora-
tion pays the state in organizational fees.77 The resulting revenue loss 
74. Less than one percent of the 1400 NYSE and AMEX firms tracked by Standard & 
Poor's Stock Report were headquartered in Delaware. All of the firms headquar-
tered in Delaware, however, were incorporated there. In contrast, while fewer than 
one percent of the same sample of corporations were headquartered in Maryland, 
only slightly more than half were incorporated in the state. Baysinger & Butler, The 
Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm,.27 J. L. & EcoN. 179, 186 (1985). 
75. See, e.g., Leepson, Keeping Business at Home, NATION'S BUSINESS 67 (May, 1987) 
(emphasizing education, tax assistance, and technical advice as the key factors in 
promoting economic growth); see also D. OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOC-
RACY 259-88 (1988). 
76. The drafters' tendency to mistakenly equate"the state of incorporation with the situs 
of plants echoes a similar error made in the past by courts confronted with share-
holder suits seeking to have the courts order the dissolution of a closed corporation 
on the grounds that its majority shareholders were oppressing the minority share-
holders. Equating dissolution with termination of the business, the early courts 
were reluctant to order dissolution, fearing that doing so might sacrifice the going-
concern value of the corporation and might thereby harm the public in the process. 
See, e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954). In reality, 
dissolution primarily affects the mode of organization, not the business activity of 
the firm. (That the corporate participants choose to do business as a corporation 
evidences their belief that the corporate form yielded some advantages. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that in marginal cases, denying the participants the corporate form 
might be sufficient to destroy·the residual value of the firm). Shareholders seeking a 
decree of dissolution rarely actually compel termination of the firm; they seek in-
stead a bargaining chip to· be used in determining the price they will receive in 
return for relinquishing their interests in the corporation. For a complete discus-
sion, see Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory 
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
77. Maryland imposes a bonus tax on the filing of articles of incorporation which may 
range fi:om a minimum of $20 to a maximum of $390 plus $20 for each $1,000,000 
in authorized capital stock in excess of $5,000,000. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE 
ANN.§ 1-204 (Supp. 1988). In addition, domestic corporations must pay an annual 
fee of $40. Jd. § 1-203(3). Foreign corporations need not pay the bonus tax. They 
must, however, pay a $40 annual fee. /d. By reincorporating elsewhere, corporate 
participants subject themselves to a second round of formation and annual fees. 
See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 391 (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
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would be devastating to Maryland's fisc if the state depended heavily for 
its revenue on such franchise taxes. But Maryland does not and, conse-
quently, the fiscal impact on Maryland of the loss of some franchise taxes 
is not likely to be substantial. Second, an exodus of Maryland corpora-
tions would hurt those individuals, including members of the state's cor-
porate bar, who provide Maryland-specific services (such as advice about 
Maryland corporate and tax law) to Maryland corporations.78 Here too, 
however, it is unclear whether this loss would be significant. The exper-
tise of Maryland's corporate bar, for example, extends to a large number 
of legal fields such as contract law, employment law, and federal securi-
ties law. One would expect few exiting corporations to change counsel 
for such matters merely because they reincorporated in a neighboring 
state. Moreover, the overall demand for expertise in Maryland corporate 
law would be little affected even if a few of Maryland's publicly traded 
corporations were to depart for greener corporate pastures. The great 
majority of Maryland corporations are small; they are apt to find the 
transaction costs of reincorporating elsewhere prohibitive. 79 
Moreover, even if the drafters were correct in believing that 
reincorporations would adversely affect the economy of the state, they 
would be hard pressed to rely on that effect alone to justify changing the 
governance rules applicable to Maryland corporations. To do so would 
require the drafters to subordinate the interests of shareholders to the 
interests of other constituencies. Although some academics have long 
advocated recognition of other interests, 80 only fourteen states now per-
mit directors to take into account the impact of corporate decisions on 
nonshareholder groups.81 Maryland does not; it holds the traditional 
78. The phrase "Maryland-specific services" refers to activities, including the giving of 
advice on Maryland corporate and tax law, which have value only so long as clients 
are incorporated in the state. At least some commentators have contended that the 
investment made by the members of Delaware's corporate bar explains that state's 
popularity as a state of incorporation. Professors Macey and Miller contend, for 
example, that such state-specific investment is one factor in explaining Delaware's 
continuing popularity as a state of incorporation. The corporate bar, they argue, 
essentially "bond" the state's commitment to keeping the Delaware corporate code 
at the head of the pack. Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Dela-
ware Corporation Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 503-506 (1987). 
79. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text. 
80. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 356 (1948). 
81. Fourteen states have adopted such statutes: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § l0-
1202(A)(Supp. 1987); Idaho, IDAHO CODE§ 30-1-35 (Hobbs-Merrill 1980); Illinois, 
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 32, ~ 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE 
ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1988); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 271A.397(4) (Baldwin 1988); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 
(Supp. 1988); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.§ 302A.251(5) (Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. 
ANN. STAT.§ 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-
2004(15)(a) (Supp. 1987); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Supp. 
1988); New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); Ohio, 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Page Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. 
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988); and, Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. 
324 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
view that a corporation should be run for the benefit of its shareholders. 82 
The drafters' repeated expression of concern that shareholders be permit-
ted to fashion their own governance rules belies any argument that the 
drafters intended a radical restatement of the traditional view. 
C. The Shareholder Empowerment Justification 
Throughout its report the Subcommittee repeatedly returns to one 
dominant theme: the new provisions are appropriate because they permit 
shareholders to privately order their own relationships. 83 In so doing the 
drafters squarely ground the new provisions on the central. freedom-of-
contract principle that holds that individuals who voluntarily commit 
themselves to a governance scheme tend to maximize their interests, at 
least over the long run. 84 The role of the state in such a regime is limited 
to facilitating the contracting process and to enforcing the resulting 
agreement. This view rejects outright the argument that the proper role 
of those who craft corporate codes is to define and impose concepts of 
procedural and substantive "fairness" on directors, officers, and share-
holders. 85 Instead, the contract principle directs drafters to eliminate the 
barriers - including mandatory fiduciary rules - which prevent corpo-
rate participants from negotiating the governance rules they prefer. 
Given the attractiveness of self-governance and the current wave of 
deregulation, someone unfamiliar with corporate theory would anticipate 
that the drafters' commitment to empowering shareholders would be re-
ceived warmly. This is unlikely to be the case for two reasons. First, as 
discussed below, many corporate theorists discount "shareholder choice" 
as a meaningful concept with respect to publicly traded corporations. 86 
Second, even if one suspends debate on whether shareholders ever actu-
ANN.§ 180.305 (West Supp. 1988). For an exhaustive listing of state director and 
officer provisions, see Hanks, supra note 1, at 1246-53. 
For discussion of the wisdom of such "other constituency" provisions, see id. at 
1227-1230; Mahoney, New Laws Place Directors in Untenable Position, NAT'L L.J., 
July 4, 1988, at 26; Steinberg, The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEC. 
REG. L.J. 184 (1984). 
82. Presumably the directors and officers of a Maryland corporation may take into ac-
count the effect of proposed acts on members of other constituencies, but only in so 
far as such effects may impact on the long-run profitability of the corporation. 
Compare Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (corpora-
tion must be run for the benefit of its shareholders) with Union Pac. R.R. v. Trust-
ees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958) (charitable contribution upheld on 
grounds that such action benefits corporation in the long-run). 
83. DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 12, 15, 16, 19, 21, reprinted in 18 U. 
BALT. L. REV. at 259-60, 262-63, 264, 265. 
84. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 
(1979). For a discussion of the development of the philosophic view that the self-
interest of man is a constructive force for collective welfare, see M. MYERS, THE 
SouL OF EcONOMIC MAN (1983). But see West, Authority, Autonomy. and Choice: 
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard 
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). 
85. SeeN. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION (1984). 
86. See infra text accompanying notes 121-126. 
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ally exercise control over their corporation, the new provisions do not 
grant shareholders such control. 87 A study of the new provisions calls 
into question the extent of the drafters' commitment to private ordering 
by shareholders. Although the new provisions afford shareholders 
greater control over the structuring of their governance rules, they limit 
that power in curious ways, and, more importantly, they enable corpo-
rate directors to override shareholder decisions in important matters. 
IV. THE NEW PROVISIONS AND THE EMPOWERMENT 
JUSTIFICATION 
No drafting effort is perfect. Critics of any piece of legislation can 
always identify a troublesome word or odd phrase. Even so, the struc-
ture of parts of the new provisions appear so inconsistent with the draft-
ers' announced purpose of empowering shareholders to fashion their own 
governance scheme that it calls into question the drafters' commitment 
to that goal. The difficulties become apparent when the liability-limiting 
provisions and the indemnification provisions are considered individu-
ally. When considered together, those provisions become even more 
troublesome. 
A. Shareholder Empowerment and the New Liability Provisions 
On first reading, the new liability-limiting provisions appear to be 
consistent with the empowerment justification. New section 2-405.2 is 
relatively uncomplicated. 88 The drafters, eschewing the mandatory pat-
tern of change adopted by states like Virginia89 and Indiana,90 crafted the 
liability-limiting provisions as a charter option provision that permits 
shareholders to amend their corporate charter to modify the liability 
rules applicable to corporate directors and officers. If, for any reason, the 
shareholders do not act, the prior rules governing liability continue in 
effect. Conversely, if shareholders choose to amend the prior rules, they 
have considerable discretion. They may eliminate director and officer 
monetary liability almost entirely. Or, if they wish, they may fashion a 
somewhat less radical revision of the existing rules. In theory, they might 
87. See infra text accompanying notes 88-120. 
88. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.§ 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988); see also id. § 2-l04(b)(8) 
(authorizing the inclusion of a liability limiting provision in the corporate charter). 
89. VA. ConE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1989) (restating the duty of a director to require him 
"to discharge his duties ... in accordance with his good faith business judgment"); 
id. § 13.1-692.l(A)(l),(2) (capping director and officer liability at the greater of 
$100,000 or twelve months' cash compensation). For a complete discussion of the 
Virginia act, see Honabach, All That Glitters: A Critique of the Revised Virginia 
Stock Corporation Act, 12 J. CORP. L. 433, 463-480 (1987). 
90. IND. ConE ANN.§ 23-1-35-l(e) (Burns Supp. 1988) (directors not liable absent wil-
ful misconduct or recklessness). For a discussion of the Indiana statute and a com-
parison to its Delaware counterpart, see Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory 
Responses to the Director and .Officer Liability Crisis, 63 IND. L.J. 181 (1987). 
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even up the ante,91 exposing directors and officers to the type of strict, 
insurance-like liability that the courts have never deemed appropriate. 92 
The important point is that under the new provisions a corporation's 
shareholders, not the drafters of the new provisions, choose whether to 
modify the liability rules applicable to their directors and officers. 93 
Although critics are likely to claim that section 2-405.2 goes too far 
in permitting shareholders to eliminate the traditional duty of care,94 the 
difficulty with it, at least from the empowerment justification, is its lim-
ited scope. Section 2-405.2(a) does not permit shareholders to eliminate 
the personal liability of a director or officer who does not act in good 
faith or who receives an improper personal benefit.95 Although share-
holders might rarely wish to eliminate liability entirely in such cases, 
they might well decide that litigating all claims alleging such behavior is 
too expensive. To conserve resources, shareholders might prefer to set a 
minimum threshold level of personal gain which the director or officer 
must realize before the behavior becomes actionable.96 Alternatively, 
they might adopt a system of nonjudicial claim resolution. 97 Some share-
holders might even choose to eschew regulation and rely entirely on port-
folio diversification.98 If section 2-405.2(a) were to to be completely 
consistent with the empowerment justification, it would leave such mat-
ters for decision by the shareholders, not the General Assembly.99 
91. Compare MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988) (shareholders 
may adopt "provision expanding or limiting the liability ... ") with DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § l02(b )(7) (Supp. 1988) (shareholders may adopt a "provision elimi-
nating or limiting the personal liability ... ") (emphasis added). 
92. See Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 247. To be sure, the drafters hardly expect 
shareholders to actually expand liability, but they permit shareholders to do so. But 
cf infra text accompanying notes 105-120 (the new indemnification provisions ulti-
mately rest power in the hands of the board of directors, not shareholders). 
93. See supra note 83. 
94. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 5, at 927-29. 
95. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a)(l)-(3) (Supp. 1988). 
96. The determination of the compensation paid by the corporation to directors and 
officers presents a classic instance of self-dealing. Yet, as a general rule, such 
amounts are determined by the board of directors. See REVISED MoDEL BusiNESS 
CORPORATION AcT § 8.11 (1984). Generally, courts will not interfere with the de-
termination of compensation set by the board so long as it is reasonable. See H. 
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 663-671 (3d ed. 1983). 
97. For example, shareholders might agree to submit allegations of self-dealing to medi-
ation or arbitration. Many firms probably handle small "breach of loyalty" claims 
by simply dismissing the employee in question. Presumably, the severance benefits 
such an employee demands and receives are affected by the nature of the dismissal. 
98. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 9! YALE L.J. 698, 711-714 
(1982); see also infra note 171. For a general discussion of portfolio theory, see E. 
ELTON & M. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALY-
SIS (3d ed. 1987); R. HAGIN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY (1979); see a/so Gilson 
& Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985). 
99. At first glance, the argument in the text may appear to be an extreme example of 
academic insistence that the drafters of the new provisions be consistent regardless 
of the likelihood that shareholders might actually notice the missing power, let 
alone employ it. After all, one might argue, it is unlikely that any corporation's 
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Perhaps more troubling is that section 2-405.2(a) only empowers 
shareholders to address the issue of personal liability of directors and 
officers for monetary damages. It does not permit them to restate the 
standard of conduct entirely.HX> No matter what action shareholders 
take, a disgruntled shareholder may still sue to set aside a proposed cor-
porate action on the grounds that the directors or officers failed to exer-
cise due care. 101 Although the board of directors might form a litigation 
committee and the committee, after due consideration, might properly 
dismiss the claim, 102 the litigation will necessarily impose costs on the 
corporation. Unscrupulous shareholders may still file strike suits to ex-
tract concessions. Therefore, despite their having implemented the new 
provisions, shareholders as a group must continue to bear both the direct 
costs of litigation and the opportunity costs th~t occur when the threat of 
personal liability for self-dealing and the annoyance of time consuming 
litigation deters managers from engaging in desirable risk taking. 103 Had 
shareholders would ever avail themselves of the power to permit directors or officers 
to engage in self-dealing. Yet shareholders (and courts attempting to determine 
what shareholders might do if asked) already permit self-dealing in some instances. 
Consider, for example, the problem of usurpation of corporate opportunities. In 
determining what is and what is not a corporate opportunity, the courts seek to 
examine the reasonable expectations of the parties. See, e.g., Burg v. Hom, 380 
F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967) (one family of shareholders did not usurp a corporate op-
portunity of a real estate development corporation by purchasing and developing 
other real estate); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (parent 
corporation did not usurp opportunity of subsidiary in not permitting subsidiary to 
participate in development of oil fields located other than in Venezuela). To the 
extent that the courts defer to the ex ante expectations of the shareholders, they 
implicitly recognize the power of shareholders to vary the scope of a fiduciary's duty 
of loyalty by agreement. 
Nevertheless, in practice the "good faith"-"loyalty" restriction of section 2-
405.2(a) is unlikely to affect shareholders adversely to any significant degree. Ac-
cord Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 247-48. Perhaps the drafters elected to 
exclude such behavior from the scope of the section as a matter of practical politics. 
The harm of their doing so will likely be small. Even those theorists who advocate 
making the entire menu of fiduciary duties elective generally recognize that "loy-
alty" issues present problems different from those presented by "care" issues. See, 
e.g., Sargent, supra note 5, at 295-302; Scott, The Role of Perceptions in Policy Anal-
ysis in Law: A Response to Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1986). 
100. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988); see also DIRECTOR 
LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 16, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 263. 
101. That the shareholder will not be permitted to recover damages, however; will likely 
undercut his incentive (and that of his attorney) to pursue the action. 
102. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979)(judicial re-
view limited to the adequacy of the procedures employed and the independence of 
the directors who decided to dismiss); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 
(Del. 1981) (same as in Auerbach except that in "demand excused" cases, the court 
may also review the sufficiency of the reasons advanced to support dismissal). But 
see Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983) (neither 
board nor special committee can dismiss action when a majority of board are 
defendants). 
103. For example, section 2-405.2(a) permits disgruntled shareholders to brand a partic-
ular decision as the product of a careless, unprofessional decision-making process. 
One can anticipate that directors, although shielded from personal liability, will 
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the drafters of section 2-405.2(a) attempted to employ the full measure of 
the empowerment justification, they would have permitted shareholders 
to shield the directors' and officers' decisions as well as the directors and 
officers themselves. 104 
B. Shareholder Empowerment and the New Indemnification Provisions 
The new indemnification provisions of section 2-418 create even 
greater problems for one who would attempt to employ the empower-
ment justification to support the recent amendments to the Maryland 
code. 105 At first glance, the new indemnification provisions appear to be 
consistent with the goal of permitting corporate participants to deter-
mine the role that the threat of personal liability is to play in regulating 
directors' and officers' behavior. Affording such participants greatly ex-
panded discretion, section 2-418(b)(1) provides that: 
A corporation may indemnify any director (and officers and 
corporate agents) ... unless it is proved that (i) the act or omis-
sion of the director was material to the cause adjudicated ... ; 
and (1) Was committed in bad faith; or·(2) Was the result of 
active and deliberate dishonesty; or (ii) The director actually 
received an improper benefit in money, property, or services; or 
(iii) In the case of any criminal proceeding, the director had 
reasonable cause to believe that the act or omission was 
unlawful. 106 
The corporation may indemnify its directors in any other action so long 
as they are not adjudged liable to the corporation. 107 
A closer reading, however, reveals that these expanded indemnifica-
tion provisions are not entirely consistent with the principle that share-
holders be permitted to determine their own fiduciary rules. First, note 
that the new indemnification provisions apply to all Maryland corpora-
tions without regard to shareholder action. Unlike with the new liability 
rules, shareholders need not act to "opt into" the new indemnification 
continue to engage in an elaborate, costly "papering" process to ward off Van 
Gorkum-type claims for personal and reputational reasons. Moreover, because 
many Maryland corporations may have taken advantage of the invitation of section 
2-406 to eliminate the right of shareholder to remove a director without cause, a 
shareholder might litigate "care" claims to establish sufficient cause for removal. 
MD. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-406 ( 1985). The exact meaning of "cause" is 
unclear, but arguably a director's breach of her duty of care constitutes "cause." 
See generally Travers, Removal of the Corporate Director During His Term of Office, 
53 IOWA L. REV. 389, 412-14 (1967). 
104. Accord Butler & Ribstein, Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation 
and The New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions, 18 U. Bait. L. Rev. 352 
(1989). Given the response of critics like Hazen, supra note 6, and Steinberg, supra 
note 5, the drafters no doubt will be bemused to find themselves criticized for not 
having gone far enough! 
105. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (Supp. 1988). 
106. /d. at § 2-418(b)(l) (emphasis added). 
107. /d. at § 2-418(b)(2)(ii). 
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regime. The new rules supplant the old ones automatically. No share-
holder action is required. Moreover, although the new rules are merely 
enabling, they are crafted so that the board of directors (or a special legal 
counsel selected by the directors), not shareholders, will usually deter-
mine whether the corporation will indemnify a defendant director, of-
ficer, or corporate agent. 108 To be sure, the drafters' decision to permit 
the board to decide initially would ordinarily be desirable, as the board 
can act more swiftly and at considerably lower cost. Even if shareholders 
believe that indemnification is inappropriate in a particular case, they 
cannot veto a decision of the board to pay it. Nor can they adopt a 
charter provision vesting in themselves the sole power to decide indemni-
fication issues. At best, shareholders can pass a precatory resolution ad-
vising the board how they would vote and threatening removal if the 
board does not concur. 109 
The dominant role played by the board of directors in determining 
whether to indemnify is particularly important given the interplay be-
tween the new indemnification provisions and the provisions relating to 
director and officer liability. As written, the new provisions permit the 
board to achieve on a case-by-case basis essentially the same result that 
shareholders might have achieved by approving a charter provision limit-
ing liability even if the shareholders have expressly rejected such an 
amendment. 110 
The only check on the board's ability to indemnify is section 2-
418(b)(2)(ii), which prohibits indemnification if the defendant is ad-
judged liable to the corporation. 111 That limitation, however, is incom-
plete for two reasons. First, it applies only to derivative actions; it is 
inapplicable to direct shareholder actions. 112 Second, even in a derivative 
action, the section 2-418(b)(2)(ii) limitation is triggered only if the direc-
108. /d. at§ 2-418(e)(2) (1985). To be sure, the drafters' decision to permit the board to 
decide initially would ordinarily be desirable, as the board can act more swiftly and 
at considerably lower cost. 
109. Cf Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E. 2d 590 (1954). The SEC's proxy rules 
also permit shareholders to use management's proxy to make precatory motions. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(l) (1988). Shareholders, however, may not use those rules to 
wage an election contest, nor may they make proposal related to matters of ordinary 
business operations, id. § 240.14a-8( c )(7),(8). Even if shareholders succeed in 
threatening management, the efficacy of precatory shareholders proposals and the 
desirability of Rule 14a-8 are both questionable. See, e.g., Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A 
Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y. L. REV. 1 (1985); Liebeler, A Proposal toRe-
scind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425 (1984). But see Ryan, 
Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. 
L. REV. 97 (1988) (the rule plays an important role in corporate governance, partic-
ularly in light of the increased activism of institutional shareholders). 
110. For example, assume that the shareholders have expressly rejected a liability-limit-
ing charter provision. Nevertheless, the board may approve indemnification against 
liability stemming from those very acts so long as the defendant is not adjudged to 
have been liable to the corporation. It is safe to assume that most defendants will 
prefer to settle. 
Ill. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.§ 2-418(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1988). 
112. Thus, even though the shareholders refuse to limit the monetary liability of direc-
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tor is adjudged to be liable. 113 It does not apply if the corporation and 
the defendant agree to settle the action, a decision generally made on 
behalf of the corporation by the board itself. Thus, so long as it is still 
able to settle the lawsuit, the board may authorize expanded indemnifica-
tion, thereby effectively imposing the new restricted liability standard, 
albeit on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the board can apply the new 
standard retroactively. Should a director confront potential liability at 
some future date for actions or omissions that occurred after the effective 
date of the act, the board in the exercise of its business judgment may 
approve settlement and indemnification as if the shareholders had 
adopted a liability-limiting charter amendment on the earliest date 
possible. 114 
Section 2-418(g) is similarly partially inconsistent with the empow-
erment justification. 115 It does empower shareholders to expand the in-
demnification rights granted by the statute. 116 It nevertheless does not 
permit shareholders to contract the scope of indemnification. More im-
portantly, it permits directors to expand indemnification rights without 
the approval of shareholders-for example, by amending the corpora-
tion's bylaws. Though directors cannot adopt bylaws unless granted the 
power to do so by the shareholders, 117 it is usual for corporate bylaws to 
contain boilerplate language which enables directors to amend existing 
bylaws. 118 Moreover, even if shareholders have reserved the power to 
adopt bylaws, their directors may still expand the availability of indemni-
fication by adopting a board resolution or by approving an· employment 
contract that authorizes expanded indemnification. 119 
In sum, both the new liability limiting provision and the new indem-
nification provisions are at best only partially consistent with drafters' 
announced purpose of amending the Maryland corporate code to em-
power the shareholders of Maryland corporations to privately order their 
own governance relations. 120 The liability limiting provisions afford 
tors and officers in a shareholder action, the directors may accomplish essentially 
·the same thing ex post by authorizing indemnification. 
113. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.§ 2-418(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1988). 
114. Act of Feb. 18, 1988, ch. 3, § 2, 1988 Md. Laws 743. 
115. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418(g) (Supp. 1988). 
116. Although the act suggests that shareholders' power is unlimited, it may be circum-
scribed by public policy. Consider, for example, a case in which a dissenting share-
holder challenges shareholder adoption of a charter provision providing 
indemnification for directors who have acted in bad faith. Though on its terms, 
Section 2-418(g) seemingly authorizes such a provision, the prohibition of section 2-
418 (b)(l) would arguably override it. Just as it seems inappropriate from the stand-
point of the Contract Model to limit the ability of the shareholders to eliminate 
liability in such a case, it is inappropriate (although consistent) to deny them the 
power to indemnify. 
117. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.§ 2-l09(b) (1985). 
118. Cf 2 R. BALOTII & J. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS Form 1.17, Art. VI§ 6.7 (1986). 
119. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418(g) (Supp. 1988). 
120. The drafters, aware that the new indemnification rules afforded directors expanded 
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shareholders only limited freedom to restructure the fiduciary duties of 
their directors and officers. Likewise, the indemnification provisions per-
mit shareholders the limited right to expand protection; they do not al-
low shareholders to contract that protection. Finally, the 
indemnification provisions inappropriately empower directors to alter li-
ability rules sub silentio by permitting them to administer the liberalized 
indemnification procedure. In fact, the board might employ the indemni-
fication procedure so as to circumvent a shareholder decision not to limit 
liability. Such failings are inconsistent with the principle that sharehold-
ers, not lawmakers or corporate fiduciaries, should fashion the govern-
ance rules applicable to Maryland's corporations. 
V. THE NEW MARYLAND PROVISIONS AND THE 
CONTRACT MODEL OF THE CORPORATION 
Although the inconsistencies between the language of the new provi-
sions and the drafters' avowed goals undercut the drafters' reliance on 
the shareholder empowerment rationale for the new provisions, those in-
consistencies may ultimately matter little in determining whether the 
provisions can be justified. Critics of the new provisions are likely to 
come from either of two camps, neither of whom will find the inconsis-
tencies central to their critique of the new legislation. One group will 
contend that shareholders, at least those of the publicly traded corpora-
tions for whom the provisions were drafted, have no real say in the gov-
ernance of their corporations. Such scholars, the traditionalists, would 
probably find the new provisions equally objectionable if they were 
drafted so as to lodge power formally in the hands of shareholders. In 
contrast, the new school of corporate theorists, the contractarians, be-
indemnification rights and empowered directors to adopt even more expansive pro-
tection, offered several explanations. First, they noted that the new provisions en-
couraged settlement of derivative actions, contending that "settlements are to be 
encouraged as a means of terminating litigation, and it is against public policy to 
discourage settlements by providing that corporate officers and directors may lose their 
indemnification unless they pursue all litigation to its ultimate conclusion." DIREC-
TOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 25, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 
267 (emphasis added). The drafters did not explain, however, why they choose to 
impose their judgment on public policy rather than to leave the matter to sharehold-
ers. Their failure to explain is crucial given that the cardinal principle of the em-
powerment justification is that in matters of internal governance, lawmakers should 
not impose their own views of "public policy" upon shareholders. 
The subcommittee also attempted to support its proposed indemnification rules 
by noting that the new provisions would "allow Maryland corporations the same 
flexibility in administering these matters as Delaware corporations." /d. at 31, re-
printed in 18 U. BALT. L. REv. at 271. While consistent with the policy of emulat-
ing Delaware (and thus perhaps eliminating one incentive a corporation might have 
for reincorporating in Delaware), that explanation again is patently inconsistent 
with the principle that shareholders should determine which governance rules they 
prefer. Moreover, as noted earlier, the new Maryland rules are far more expansive 
than Delaware's. Whether good, bad, or indifferent, the new Maryland provisions 
clearly "out-Delaware" Delaware. 
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lieve that shareholders can fend for themselves. They may find portions 
of the new rules-despite their curious drafting - acceptable when ap-
plied to shareholders of some Maryland corporations. On the other 
hand, they will find some portions unacceptable and will question the 
propriety of imposing any of the new legislation on the shareholders of 
certain other corporations. 
While accepting the belief that shareholders "own" the corporation, 
traditionalists have long derided attempts to apply the rhetoric of share-
holder choice to matters of corporate govemance.J21 Analogizing the re-
lationship between shareholders and corporate directors and officers to 
that between trust beneficiaries and trustees, 122 traditionalists contend 
that corporate managers, like their trustee counterparts, actually estab-
lish and implement all corporate policies. 123 Formal organizational rules 
placing shareholders at the base of the corporate power pyramid matter 
little, because management's control of the proxy machinery enables it to 
maintain control and dictate corporate action. 124 Shareholder action or 
inaction, traditionalists argue, is not an expression of shareholder will; it 
merely echoes the interests of those corporate managers who control the 
medium of shareholder expression. 125 The appearance that shareholders 
determine corporate policy and practice, traditionalists maintain, is noth-
ing more than a clever illusion. 126 
Because scholars of the traditional school believe that management, 
not shareholders, controls corporations, they dismiss claims that charac-
121. See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
tract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985). ' 
122. See, e.g., D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL-A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (1986). The "Trust Model" of the corporation 
was popularized by A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 80, in which they argued 
that the management of corporate assets had become separated from ownership. 
They advanced the theory that managers exercised relatively unrestrained authority 
over corporate assets. Contract theorists have roundly criticized the Berle-Means 
theory. See, e.g., R. WINTERS, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978). 
123. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION - A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1976). 
124. !d. 
125. Traditionalists deny the validity even of explicit shareholder approval. For exam-
ple, in reviewing the recent directors' and officers' liability-limiting legislation, Pro-
fessor Steinberg argues: 
Although this argument (that shareholders who vote for a charter amend-
ment have consented) has certain appeal, its validity rings hollow in light 
of the realities of the corporate governance process. Meaningful share-
holder consent in this context is an illusion given management's control of 
the proxy machinery process, the strong inclination of institutional inves-
tors to vote with management, and the typical individual shareholders' 
ignorance of corporate charter provisions. 
Steinberg, supra note 5, at 927. Characterizing the resulting arrangements as adhe-
sion contracts, Steinberg concludes that they lack validity. !d. 
126. Schwartz, Shareholder Democracy: A Reality or Chimera?, 25 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 
53, 54 ( 1983) ("[The notion of shareholder democracy] engenders illusions of share-
holder power while discouraging alternative constraints. These illusions are danger-
ous; they are the laetrile to the problem of corporate accountability."). 
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terize "corporate reforms" as attempts to empower shareholders. They 
view "reforms" like Maryland's as little more than transparent attempts 
by state .legislatures to attract corporations, and the incorporation and 
franchise fees they bring, by catering to the managers' appetite for 
power. 127 Given that perspective, traditionalists are certain to view the 
new amendments to Maryland's code as a pernicious loosening of the 
already weak restraints on self-serving behavior by corporate directors 
and officers. 128 Such legislation, traditionalists will conclude, leads not to 
improved corporate governance but rather to an escalation of the "race 
to the bottom." 129 
In contrast, the contractarians130 believe that shareholders by and 
127. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 
(1974); Hazen, supra note 6; Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976). 
128. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 5, at 928. 
129. See Hazen, supra note 6, at 179-82. 
130. The "Contract Model" of the corporation has given rise to an outpouring of writ-
ings. The leading figure in the development of the model is Dean Henry Manne. 
See, e.g., Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, An Essay in Honor of 
Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964) [hereinafter Share Voting]; Manne, 
Mergers and the Market for Control, 73 J.P. E. 110 (1965) [hereinafter Market for 
Control]; Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. 
REV. 259 (1967) [hereinafter Two Systems]. For a representative sample of other 
writings, see Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution, supra note 67; Bays-
inger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law, supra note 74; Butler, Corporation-Spe-
cific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. 
REv. 365 (1988); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 104; Carney, supra note 62; Easter-
brook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. 
J. CoRP. L. 540 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 98; Fischel, The Corpo-
rate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Fischel & Bradley, The 
Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986); Gilson, The Case Against 
Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982); Honabach, supra note 89; Macey & McChesney, Prop-
erty Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987); 
Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. I I I (1987); 
Scott, Corporation Law & the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983). 
Recently, the adherents of the contract model have begun to divide into two 
groups: those who apply a "strong form" model of the corporate contract, see, e.g., 
the writings of Butler, Easterbrook, Fischel, and Ribstein noted above; and those 
who have begun to develop a "weak form" or "consensualist" model of the corpo-
rate contract. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 62; Coffee, No Exit? Opting Out, The 
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988) [hereinafter No Exit]. 
The "strong form" contractarians apply a more or less rigorous neo-classical 
version of contractual theory focusing primarily on the formation of the contract 
and the determination of its terms. The "weak form" con tractarians, on the other 
hand, have begun to challenge that emphasis, contending that contract law is a 
much more richly textured set of principles than that employed by the "strong 
form" contractarians. The "weak form" contractarians argue that contractarians 
need to acknowledge that classical contract law gave way to doctrines recognizing 
the need for judicial intervention to prevent, among other things, post-formation 
opportunistic behavior. Coffee, No Exit, supra, at 939; cf Aivazian, Trebilcock & 
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large are fully capable of protecting their own interests. These scholars 
view the corporation as a nexus of contracts through which corporate 
participants, including both managers and shareholders, interact. 131 
Contractarians argue that because each party to the corporate "contract" 
seeks to maximize his own interests, conflicts of interest are inevitable. 
The costs of such conflicts-the agency costs-include the direct and in-
direct costs of monitoring the behavior of others, the costs incurred by 
managers to bond their performance, and the costs of opportunities man-
agers forego because of overly stringent liability rules. 132 Rejecting the 
traditionalist's claim that these costs are best minimized by judicially en-
forced fiduciary rules, contractarians contend that corporate partici-
pants, foreseeing the inevitability of such conflicts, will fashion their own 
efficient governance techniques. They assert that corporate participants 
need not rely solely on legislators or the courts for protection from over-
reaching by their fellow participants. 
Con tractarians believe that the error of traditional scholars in view-
ing shareholders as helpless can be attributed to the traditionalists' al-
most exclusive focus on the role played by the formal rules of corporate 
governance. 133 Contractarians argue that parties to the corporate con-
tract rely on a mixture of "voice" rules and "exit" techniques to mini-
mize agency costs. 134 Voice rules encompass the formal procedural rules 
of the corporation that permit corporate parties to participate directly in 
the governance of the corporation. Quorum and voting rules are exam-
ples. Contractarians view the governance rules embedded in the corpo-
rate code-including the fiduciary duty rules that traditionalists prize-
as nothing more than a set of default voice rules which apply absent ex-
Penny, The Law of Contract Modification: The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of 
Enforceability, 22 OsGOODE HALL L. J. 173 ( 1984) (some contract doctrines are 
intended to prevent opportunistic modifications of contracts); Muris, Opportunistic 
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981). It is unclear at 
this juncture whether the development of the "weak form" of the contract model 
represents the evolution of the model, a heresy, or, as Grant Gilmore suggested, the 
inevitable germination of the self-destructive seeds inherent in all conceptual sys-
tems. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACTS (1974). 
131. See generally supra note 130. See also Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 
386 (1986); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structures, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976); Williamson, The Mod-
ern Corporation: Origins, Evolutions, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1197 (1984). Not 
all commentators find the contract model useful. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 121. 
132. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.P. E. 660 (1980). For a 
general discussion of "agency costs," see W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BusiNESS OR-
GANIZATION AND FINANCE 157-58 (2d ed. 1986). 
133. See, e.g., Manne, Two Systems, supra note 130, at 273. 
134. For a full discussion of the terminology of exit and voice, see A. 0. HIRSCHMAN, 
ExiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). The seminal article applying such analysis to 
the corporate field is Dean Manne's Market for Control, supra note 130; see also R. 
WINTERS, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 17-18 ( 1978); Easterbrook, The-
ories and Evidence, supra note 130, at 553-557; Jensen & Ruback, The Market for 
Control: The Scientific Evidence, II J. FIN. EcoN. 5 (1983). 
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press alteration by the parties. 135 
Because exercising voice rules is expensive, contractarians empha-
size, most shareholders do not employ voice techniques as their primary 
check on agency costs; instead, they resort to "exit" techniques. 136 Exit 
techniques are essentially market strategies by which a member of any 
organization registers her dissatisfaction with an organization by leaving. 
For example, a corporate shareholder who becomes unhappy with the 
performance of her directors and officers often expresses her dissatisfac-
tion by selling her shares. 137 Contractarians believe that exiting exerts an 
indirect but powerful discipline on corporate directors and officers. Ar-
guing that because the market for corporate shares is informationally effi-
cient, i.e., the price of a security at any given time accurately impounds 
all publicly available information about corporate performance, includ-
ing managerial performance, 138 con tractarians maintain that deficient 
managerial behavior will trigger a decline in the market price of the cor-
poration's securities. Unless management corrects its performance, the 
price of the corporation's securities will continue to fall until it becomes 
worthwhile for some investor to acquire control of the corporation, oust 
the incumbent managers, and alter management behavior. 139 Con-
135. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 369-72 (3d ed. 1986); Baysinger & 
Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment and the Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985) [hereinafter Antitakeover 
Amendments]; Fischel, supra note 130; Manne, Share Voting, supra note 130. 
136. See, e.g., Manne, Market for Control, supra note 130. 
137. Such exit is generally referred to as the "Wall Street Rule." W. KLEIN & J. CoF-
FEE, supra note 132, at 161. If a sufficient number of the participants of any group 
exits (or makes credible threats to exit), they may force a modification of the policies 
of the organization, because the incumbent managers either will change or will be 
replaced to end the exodus. If the exodus continues unabated, the identity of the 
organization will be mutated to reflect the remaining membership. A.O. HIRSCH-
MAN, supra note 134. 
138. The statement in the text is a statement of the "semi-strong" forin of the Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH). The ECMH maintains that security prices at 
any time fully reflect all publicly available information, i.e., profitable trading strate-
gies or arbitrage opportunities are not possible. The ECMH is presented in three 
forms: (1) the weak form which simply maintains that histories of securities prices 
could not reveal profitable trading opportunities; (2) the semi-strong form which, as 
stated above, maintains that securities prices reflect all publicly available informa-
tion; and (3) the strong form which maintains that prices reflect all information 
whether public or private. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market 
Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374-381 (1984); 
Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
554-565 (1984). Con tractarians generally take the ECMH as a given. See, e.g., But-
ler & Ribstein, supra note 104, at 353-60. But compare Wang, Some Arguments 
That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986) (the 
capital market may not be "information-arbitrage" efficient and, in any event, may 
not be "fundamental-valuation" efficient) with Dennis, Valuing the Firm and The 
Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 17 RUTGERS L.J. l, 9-13 (1985) (the mar-
ket is efficient in both senses). 
139. See generally Manne, Two Systems, supra note 130. Of course, within limits manag-
ers can usurp wealth without fear of reprisal because the costs to shareholders of 
effective monitoring exceed the benefits shareholders derive from monitoring. Pre-
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tractarians believe that the threat of such a takeover deters incumbent 
managers from shirking and engaging in other forms of mismanagement 
as effectively as (and generally at a lower cost than) a threatened proxy 
fight or a suit alleging breaches of management's fiduciary duties. 140 
Moreover, because the prerequisite of market discipline-an active mar-
ket for the corporation's shares-exists as a by-product of securities trad-
ing, shareholders (at least those who hold shares in publicly traded 
corporations) find exiting to be relatively inexpensive. Consequently, 
contractarians believe, shareholders resort to voice rules to correct mana-
gerial performance only in extreme or unusual cases. 141 
Because they believe that the corporate governance is an evolving, 
self-checking process, contractarians-at least members of the "strong 
model" school 142-tend to perceive rule changes like those adopted in 
Maryland as part of an ongoing "climb to the top." 143 Over time, they 
assert, governance rules tend to come to resemble each other because 
corporate participants copy the more efficient governance rules engi-
neered by others. Though changing conditions ensure that corporation 
codes will continue to evolve, contractarians believe that at any given 
moment there exists a general equilibrium between liberal codes and 
strict codes. 144 Because shareholders - again at least those of relatively 
sumably most managers already will have extracted such benefits up to the point 
where the costs to shareholders of additional monitoring equal the benefits to share-
holders of additional monitoring. Scholarship on the subject appears to assume that 
managers will "consume" whatever amounts they appropriate. Recently, however, 
it has become evident that managers instead may "invest" all or part of such 
amounts in "rent-seeking" activity. That is, they may lobby the state legislature for 
firm-specific anti-takeover legislation. If successful in securing passage of such legis-
lation, they may realize enhanced gains in future periods because the legislation 
shelters them somewhat more from the disciplinary effects of the market for control. 
See generally Butler, Corporation Specific Statutes, supra note 130. 
140. Manne, Market for Control, supra note 130, at 114-15. 
141. The market for corporate control is not the sole market-derived source of manage-
rial discipline. Other market-based restraints include the market for capital, the 
product market, and the market for managers. See Easterbrook, Theories and Evi-
dence, supra note 130. 
142. For a discussion of "strong" and "weak" schools of contractarians, see supra note 
130. Throughout the remainder of this article, the term con tractarians will be used 
to refer to those scholars who employ the "strong form" of the model; the term 
consenualists will be used to refer to those scholars who employ the "weak form" of 
the model. 
143. Baysinger & Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and 
Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431 (1985); Fischel, The "Race to the 
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation 
Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982). 
144. Baysinger and Butler, supra note 143, at 456-62. A "strict statute" relies heavily on 
non-market oversight. Corporate participants are given little discretion to vary the 
corporate rules. "Liberal" statutes, on the other hand, afford the participants con-
siderable discretion with which to fashion governance rules. In theory, corporate 
participants may find "strict" statutes beneficial because they enable participants to 
"bond" their performance of desirable behavior. But see Gordon, Ties That Bond: 
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. 
REV. l (1988) (state corporate codes are ineffective as bonding vehicles because 
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large corporations- can choose to incorporate wherever they wish with-
out affecting the location of their business activities, they can choose 
from a wide variety of codes in selecting their governance regime. 145 
They need subject themselves to a particular state's corporate code only 
so long as that code meets their requirements. If another state offers a 
superior statutory product, they reincorporate there. So long as share-
holders can freely choose which corporate code will govern their affairs, 
they are helped, not hurt, by the competition among states. 146 
The Contract Model provides persuasive, if controversial, 147 support 
for the drafters' assertion that shareholders should be empowered to for-
mulate their own governance schemes. The drafters of the new provi-
sions, however, can invoke that model only so long as the new provisions 
are not imposed on unwilling shareholders. The principle that underlies 
the Contract Model-voluntary exchanges are pareto superior moves, 148 
at least as between the contracting parties-requires that changes in the 
"contracts" of existing corporations not be made without the explicit or 
implicit consent of corporate participants. 149 Unfortunately, the drafters 
participants can secure ameliorating changes in the statute or may reincorporate 
elsewhere). 
145. For a discussion of the reincorporation literature, see Romano, Law as a Product: 
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Law as a Product]. 
146. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 74, at 191; Fischel, supra note 143, at 921-22. 
147. The controversy over the contract model can be broken down into several disputes. 
First, as noted above, even within the contractarian camp some theorists employ the 
"strong form" of the model (the contractarians); others employ the "weak form" 
(the consenualists). The former generally see no place for mandatory rules; the lat-
ter view some mandatory rules as necessary. Their difference centers on the ques-
tion of whether shareholders can sufficiently overcome the collective-action/free-
rider problems that may compel shareholders to make suboptimal decisions. The 
dispute about whether or not shareholders can do so bedevils attempts to imply 
consent. For a general description of those problems by leading theorists who may 
or may not be consenualists, see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389-400 (1986); 
Gordon, supra note 144, at 42-60. 
A second dispute centers on the more general question of whether the capital 
market accurately prices changes in governance rules. While many contractarians 
posit that the efficiency of the capital market is an uncontestable fact, other com-
mentators argue that the market may be too blunt a tool to reflect accurately the 
desirability of various governance schemes. Compare Butler & Ribstein, supra note 
104, at 353-60 with Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate Law Analysis: A 
Comment on Weiss and White, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1015 (1988). Finally, as noted 
earlier, still other scholars reject the Contract Model entirely, employing instead the 
traditional Berle-Means approach, see, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 5; or proffering a 
wholly different conceptual lens, see Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: 
Beyond Berte and Means, 22 MICH. J.L. REF. 19 (1988) (developing a "Power 
Model" of the corporation). 
148. A pareto superior move is commonly defined as "one that makes at least one person 
better off and no one worse off." R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (3d 
ed. 1986). Voluntary transactions are thought to be pareto superior, at least as be-
tween the parties, because the parties freely consent to the exchange. 
149. Of course, to the extent that the drafters hoped to make the Maryland code attrac-
tive to corporations, they will find little solace in having met the requirements of the 
model by including provisions which the shareholders of Maryland's publicly traded 
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did not craft the new provisions in a fashion which ensures that the new 
governance scheme is applicable only to shareholders who consent to the 
alteration of their contract. 150 
In some instances ascertaining consent presents no problems. For 
example, individuals who purchased their shares knowing of when the 
applicability of the new provisions became effective may be deemed to 
have consented implicitly to at least some applications of those provi-
sions.151 Even individual shareholders who purchased their shares una-
ware of the new rules should generally be deemed to have consented to 
their application, because the price they paid for their shares will have 
reflected the impact of the new rules. 152 
The major difficulty in ascertaining consent, even for the most 
staunch contractarian, arises in applying the new provisions to those in-
dividuals who purchased their shares prior to the enactment of the new 
provisions. Can shareholders who purchased their shares before the new 
rules were enacted and who did not vote for their implementation never-
theless be deemed to have consented to their application? Two types of 
arguments can be advanced to support the claim that they have. The 
first argument is that shareholders consent to all future changes in the 
governance rules so long as such changes are made in accordance with 
the applicable statutory procedure. Such an argument-an "entrance" 
argument-might be grounded on the claim that because the Maryland 
corporate code contains a "reserved powers" provision, 153 all corporate 
participants agree ex ante to whatever rule changes the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly approves. The entrance argument might be extended fur-
ther to include any changes approved by corporate participants pursuant 
to code provisions permitting such changes, again on the theory that 
shareholders have delegated unrestricted decision making authority to a 
designated subset of the shareholder group.154 
The second type of argument for inferring consent, an exit argu-
ment, focuses on a shareholder's response to the passage of new provi-
sions. According to such an argument, a shareholder who does not sell 
corporations find so unsatisfactory that they cause their corporations to 
reincorporate elsewhere to avoid the application of those provisions. 
150. Those failings, unfortunately, are likely to provide a basis for critics to argue that 
the new provisions were drafted with the interests of management, not shareholders, 
in mind. 
151. Thus, if a corporation includes liability limiting provisions in its initial charter, all 
shareholders of the corporation would be deemed to have consented to those provi-
sions. Similarly, shareholders who purchase the corporation's shares after it has 
amended its charter to include the provisions would be deemed to have consented to 
them. In the case of such midstream amendments, however, it is likely to be im-
practicable-at least for publicly traded corporations-to track when individual 
shareholders purchased their shares. 
152. See Dennis, supra note 138. It seems appropriate to charge share buyers with the 
duty to acquire knowledge about the governance rules applicable to the corporation 
into which they are buying. 
153. Mo. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 1-1029(e)(l988). 
154. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 104, at 359-60. 
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her shares (i.e., does not exit) wheri confronted with the new provisions 
may be deemed to have implicitly consented to the new governance rules, 
whatever their source. 155 In effect, she is treated as if she had sold her 
shares and then repurchased them subject to the new provisions. 156 As 
noted earlier, exit arguments play a central role in most versions of the 
contract model. 157 
Although entrance arguments have a superficial appeal, they cannot 
be advanced without eroding the validity of the shareholder consent ar-
gument. The normative appeal of the contract model of the corporation 
rests upon the claim that shareholders, as individuals, have chosen to 
enter into a corporate "contract" they believe to be beneficial. But if the 
resulting "contract" may be altered by the General Assembly whenever 
it believes different rules would be appropriate, the "contract" amounts 
to nothing more than an agreement to do business on whatever terms the 
state imposes. 158 Likewise, the concept of contract becomes meaningless 
if shareholders are to be deemed to have relinquished unconstrained 
power to a supermajority of shareholders to restructure governance rules. 
The power of the Contract Model depends upon the ability of parties to 
bargain explicitly or implicitly for the terms that best suit them. 
Designating an entirely open-ended arrangement a "contract" blurs com-
pletely the distinction between a regulatory system of oversight and the 
contract system. Usirtg contract language to describe such a relationship 
is a mere rhetorical flourish. 
It is important to note that in dismissing a universal, "anything 
155. Butler and Ribstein distinguish between state-decreed changes in the corporate con-
tract and changes decreed by shareholders. They decry the former, suggesting that 
such changes may even be unconstitutional. They generally approve of the latter, 
arguing that the initial contract among shareholders explicitly permits such modifi-
cation. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 104, at 359-60; see also Butler & Ribstein, 
State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 611, 
631-637 (1988) [hereinafter The Contract Clause]. 
Their belief that all shareholder-decreed modifications are acceptable rests 
upon the assumption that shareholders ex ante have consented to any and all 
changes their fellow shareholders might make. It seems more probable, however, 
that their initial consent applies only to a set of changes falling within some range of 
permissable options. That is, in permitting her fellow shareholders to alter the cor-
porate contract, a shareholder probably assumed that their exercise of that power 
was· constrained by notions of "good faith" and "fiduciary duty." Butler and Rib-
stein themselves appear to recognize some restraints. Butler & Ribstein, The Con-
tract Clause, supra. The difficult task, of course, is determining which shareholder-
decreed changes are permissible and which are not. See infra notes 161-168 and 
accompanying text. 
156. For discussion of similar reasoning in the field of corporate taxation, see BITTKER & 
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
§ 11.05 (5th ed. 1987). 
157. See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text. 
158. If the corporate contract can be varied unilaterally by the state, the contract model 
would differ little from the concession model it replaces. For discussions of the 
"concession model," see LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS 170-79 (1971); Hessen, A New 
Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1327 (1979). 
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goes" entrance argument, one need not resort exclusively to exit argu-
ments, or, in the alternative, return to the "vested rights" regime which 
required unanimous explicit shareholder approval of any changes in the 
corporate contract. 159 To the contrary, shareholders realize that a fully 
specified contract is impossible; 160 they appreciate that organizational 
rules, including governance terms, must be modified over time to reflect 
changing conditions. And they recognize that if explicit, unanimous 
shareholder approval were required for every change, individual share-
holders might opportunistically threaten to veto a necessary change in 
order to secure a bribe. Shareholders appreciate that the state or a desig-
nated group of shareholders must be permitted to impose ordinary 
changes without the consent of every shareholder. Conversely, share-
holders can properly insist under the contract model that fundamental 
changes be made only with individualized consent. 
Distinguishing between those changes which are deemed to be "fun-
damental" (and hence variable only with the consent of all parties) and 
those deemed to be "ordinary" (and thus variable despite the dissent of 
some shareholders) is a formidable task. To apply an entrance argument, 
one must distinguish between changes on the basis of their foreseeability 
at the time the holder of the shares purchased her shares. 161 For pur-
poses of this article, "ordinary" changes are those which were foreseeable 
at the time the particular shareholder purchased her shares; "fundamen-
tal" changes are those which were not foreseeable at that time. Because 
the price a shareholder pays for her shares reflects reasonably foreseeable 
events-including potential future changes in governance rules162-a 
shareholder may be deemed to have consented implicitly to ordinary 
changes ex ante when she purchased her shares. It makes no difference 
whether the change was made by the state or her fellow shareholders. 
Conversely, if the change were so radical that it was not reasonably fore-
seeable at the time the shareholder purchased her shares, the price she 
paid would not have reflected an appropriate discount for the possibility 
of that change. Any discount would simply have reflected the general 
159. See generally Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and 
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69 (1980). 
160. A "fully specified contract" or a "fully contingent contract" is one that provides 
terms for governing relations in any possible future event. POLINSKY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (1983); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 66-69 (1975). Such con-
tracts are not possible. For a thorough discussion of strategies one might employ to 
address the problems of incomplete contracts, see Goetz & Scott, Principles of Rela-
tional Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). 
161. The choice of the "fundamental" and "ordinary" terminology may seem at first 
unfortunate given the difficulty the courts and commentators have faced in attempt-
ing to distinguish between ordinary corporate decisions requiring only the approval 
of the board of directors and fundamental (or extraordinary) transactions requiring 
both director and shareholder approval. See generally GILSON, supra note 23, at 
557-580. In fact, however, the choice is appropriate because the question is similar 
both as to its substance and its intractability. 
162. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
1989] Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corporation 341 
uncertainty inherent in holding corporate shares. 163 A shareholder can-
not be deemed to have consented to such fundamental changes. Again, it 
matters not a whit whether the change is imposed by the state or by 
fellow shareholders. 
Of course, determining whether a change was reasonably foreseeable 
is no easy feat. Crude rules of thumb are possible, but not particularly 
helpful. For example, a few changes, like an increase or decrease in 
board size, seem easy to classify as "foreseeable" because they are both 
explicitly authorized by the corporate code and are common. 164 Most 
changes, however, are much more difficult to classify. For example, 
some changes not now permitted by the Maryland General Corporations 
Law, such as reducing the required shareholder vote on fundamental 
transactions from two-thirds to a bare majority, nevertheless might be 
objectively foreseeable because the trend toward requiring only a simple 
majority approval is well established. 165 On the other hand, some 
changes appear to be so radical that no one would contend that they were 
reasonably foreseeable when the shareholder purchased her shares. For 
example, it would be difficult to argue that a shareholder who purchased 
her shares prior to 1986 foresaw (or, more precisely, that the market 
foresaw and, therefore, priced) the possibility that the General Assembly 
would abolish or permit shareholders to abolish the monetary liability of 
directors and officers in "due care" cases. 166 Before that date, no state 
had ever done so. 167 The difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining at 
what date the modification of the fiduciary duty rules applicable to 
163. That is, whenever an individual purchases an asset, she must discount its value to 
reflect the possibility that unforeseen events, including a change in legal rules, will 
deprive her of its value. She cannot, however, be deemed to have consented to the 
possibility merely because in some general sense she has taken into account the 
possibility of a cataclysmic event, lest she be deemed to have consented to all future 
events. 
164. See, e.g., MD. CORPS & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-402 (c) (1985 & Supp. 1988); RE-
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8:03 (1984). 
165. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 7.25(c), 10.03(e)(2) (1984). 
Thirty-two jurisdictions require approval of an amendment by only a simple major-
ity of the shares entitled to vote. Twenty jurisdictions require a two-thirds vote, at 
least in some instances. See generally MoDEL BusiNESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 1174 (3d 
ed. Supp. 1988). 
166. If anything, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom might well 
have caused would-be shareholders to anticipate even stricter application of the 
traditional fiduciary duties. For discussions of Van Gorkom and reactions thereto, 
see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
167. Even then, Delaware's path-breaking legislation was far more limited than the new 
Maryland rules. It applies only to directors and preserves the traditional loyalty 
rules. See supra note 28. For a discussion of the significance of protecting directors 
but not officers, see Honabach, supra note 89, at 470-474 (1987). 
Even now it might require too much speculation on the part of a purchaser to 
discount share prices appropriately. Recent purchasers of shares of Maryland cor-
porations are not likely to have discounted consciously the price they paid to reflect 
the recent revisions in the statute. If anything, the Maryland General Assembly's 
1987 rejection of proposed modifications might well have been misinterpreted as 
signaling Maryland's willingness to retain the traditional fiduciary rules. 
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Maryland corporations became sufficiently foreseeable to be reflected in 
the discounted price of a corporation's shares evidences the impractica-
bility of using "entrance" theories to infer consent to all but the most 
uncontroversial changes.l68 
Though entrance theories of consent are inadequate for determining 
whether to infer shareholder consent to the adoption of the new Mary-
land provisions, the drafters' might still draw support from the strong 
form of the Contract Model if the decision of current shareholders not to 
exit can be deemed to supply the necessary consent. 169 As a first step in 
determining whether to infer consent from a shareholder's decision to 
hold her shares, it is useful to divide corporations roughly into two 
groups: "open corporations" and "closed corporations." As used in the 
remainder of this article, an "open corporation" is one whose shares are 
publicly traded and in which no single shareholder (or group of share-
holders) owns absolute control. The category of "closed corporations" 
includes all others. 110 
Contractarians believe that because shareholders of an open corpo-
ration can exit through the public market at a relatively trivial cost, their 
decision to hold rather than sell in the face of changing governance rules 
implies consent. For example, if a shareholder of an open corporation 
believes his fellow shareholders have erred in eliminating the personal 
liability of corporate directors and officers, he can sell his shares and 
invest elsewhere. Though the price he receives will impound the effect of 
the liability-limiting charter amendment, the shareholder should lose lit-
tle, particularly if he has appropriately diversified his portfolio. 171 The 
168. There are other problems with using "entrance" arguments to determine consent. 
For example, such an approach would require corporations to keep track of both 
the identity of their shareholders and also the dates on which they purchased their 
shares. Depending upon the facts, individuals who purchased their shares on differ-
ent dates might be deemed to have consented with respect to later purchases but not 
earlier ones. 
169. As previously discussed, theorists of one branch of the Contract Model, the consen-
sualists, view post-formation modifications of the corporate charter as particularly 
vulnerable points for opportunistic behavior by some corporate participants. See 
supra note 130. 
170. As used in this article, the phrase "closed corporations" includes those corporations 
which are publicly traded but in which a single shareholder or group owns absolute 
control ("nonopen publicly traded corporations"); corporations which are not pub-
licly traded corporations but which have many passive investors ("nonpublicly 
traded corporations"); and, corporations which are not publicly traded but in which 
all participants are active players in determining corporate policy ("closely-held cor-
porations"). 
It is important to distinguish between a "closed corporation" as that term is 
used here and a statutory "close corporation" formed under the Maryland General 
Corporation Act. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (1985 & 
Supp. 1988). The latter is one of a subset of corporations whose shareholders have 
unanimously elected to be governed by the special provisions of Maryland's close 
corporation act. /d. § 4-lOl(b). In theory, any corporation can be a close corpora-
tion. In practice, only small corporations with a few shareholders elect close corpo-
ration status. 
171. Portfolio theory divides the risks to which all investments are subject into two cate-
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discipline of the market creates a floor below which the market price is 
unlikely to fall, because directors and officers who consider imposing a 
liability limitation over the objection of the majority of their shareholders 
realize that the price of the corporation's securities would decline if they 
did so. If that decline were significant (as it would be if adoption of the 
provision significantly injured shareholders), it would trigger a hostile 
takeover by an investor who would dismiss the current directors and of-
ficers and reimpose the old rules. 172 Recognizing that possibility ex ante, 
directors and officers are unlikely to modify governance rules radically 
without first securing a strong expression of approval from current share-
holders. Shareholders in most open corporations can even circumvent 
gories: (l) systematic risk; and (2) unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is the risk of 
holding any asset. For example, the risk of a dramatic increase or decrease in the 
inflation rate affects to some extent the value of all assets. An investor cannot elimi-
nate systematic risk by diversification or by any other means, although he can select 
among investments that are more or less sensitive to broad moves in the economy. 
Unsystematic risk, on the other hand, is the risk associated with holding a 
particular asset. Examples include the risk of a company labor dispute and the risk 
of new invention that eliminates the market for the company's product. An investor 
can largely wash away such unsystematic risk by diversifying his investment portfo-
lio. By broadly mixing holdings in various assets, an investor can virtually assure 
that any significant decrease in the value of one investment is "washed out" by an 
offsetting gain in another. Assume, for example, the existence of an economy con-
sisting of two products, guns and butter, which their manufacturers can produce 
with equal profitability. Assume further that at any given time consumer demand 
for one product will be 1, and for the other, 0. Finally, assume that in either case, 
the value for each good is equal. An individual holding only shares in one or the 
other will either profit or suffer complete losses if. his particular corporation suc-
ceeds or fails. A shareholder holding an evenly split portfolio, however, will profit 
regardless of which particular firm prospers. Because he can eliminate unsystematic 
risk through diversification, an investor cannot expect other partiCipants in the ven-
ture to compensate him for bearing that risk. He will find that the price of securities 
in a "thick" market will reflect only the systematic risk associated with holding that 
security. 
Because an amendment to the articles of any particular corporation should af-
fect only the income stream available to shareholders of that corporation, the 
amendment would affect the price of the securities of only that corporation. A 
shareholder who has diversified his portfolio, therefore, should find that only a por-
tion of his shares experience any value shift. Moreover, if the amendment increases 
the ability of his managers to engage in opportunistic behavior, investors may find 
that the value of the shares of the other corporations which are part of his portfolio 
wiJI increase (at least if the managers of those firms can credibly bond their promise 
not to adopt a similar amendment sometime in the future). It is unlikely that the 
gains will offset losses perfectly, but any Joss the shareholder incurs will have been 
minimized by holding a diversified portfolio. 
For a general discussion of portfolio theory, see SHARPE, PoRTFOLIO THEORY 
AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1980); see also E. ELTON & M. GRUBER, supra note 98; 
R. HAGIN, supra note 98. 
172. Of course, if in increasing the discretion of the managers, the charter amendment 
sheltered them from the discipline of the market for control, the decline in the value 
of the shares could be substantial without triggering a takeover. There is no evi-
dence, however, that charter amendments that permit shareholders to shield fiducia-
ries from personal liability for breaches of their duty of care significantly impair the 
operation of the market for control. 
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mandatory rules like the new indemnification provisions. Because of 
their size, open corporations tend to operate in many states; they gener-
ally have no special attachment to being incorporated in any particular 
one. For such corporations, the costs of reincorporating are apt to be 
relatively small. 173 If the state of incorporation were to impose 
mandatory rules that were injurious, shareholders and managers would 
often find reincorporating elsewhere an inexpensive, curative option. 
In short, some con tractarians believe that the shareholders of Mary-
land's open corporations can protect themselves from suboptimal gov-
ernance rules by employing some form of exit. 174 They would argue that, 
as a result, the shareholders of those corporations who do not exit, or 
cause their corporation to exit, should be deemed to have consented to 
the new provisions. Accordingly, to the extent that the new provisions 
are applied only to Maryland's open corporations, contractarians are apt 
to support them. 
On the other hand, con tractarians should find the application of the 
new provisions to Maryland's closed corporations indefensible. 175 In the 
case of closed corporations, one cannot easily infer consent from a share-
holder's decision to hold rather than sell his shares. Exiting is relatively 
more expensive for shareholders of a closed corporation; they may be 
locked in even though they oppose the new governance arrangements. 
Shareholders in corporations whose shares are not publicly traded cannot 
simply sell their shares, because there is no market for them (except for 
the offer of their fellow shareholders to purchase their shares as a "cour-
tesy"--often at a substantial discount). Unlike his counterpart in an 
open corporation, a shareholder of a closed corporation who disagrees 
with a proposed change may have little choice but to continue to hold his 
shares. 176 
173. See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 145, at 248-49. 
174. Cf Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendment, supra note 135. 
175. It is important that the Reader recall that the term "closed corporation" as used 
herein does not refer only to the traditional small, entrepreneur-dominated firm. 
For a definition of a "closed corporation" as that term is used in this article, see 
supra note 170. 
176. Some con tractarians argue that just the opposite may be true. Because shareholders 
in closely-held corporations are so vulnerable, Easterbrook and Fischel maintain, 
they readily appreciate the need for planning. Moreover, because they are relatively 
few in number and tend to be active in the corporation (at least initially), they can 
and do draft relatively detailed governance provisions. Such provisions take two 
forms. First, the charters of closely-held corporations often vary the normal voice 
rules to require a supermajority or unanimous vote at both the board and share-
holder levels. Shareholders of Maryland corporations can elect "close corporation" 
status, which automatically imposes a unanimity requirement for most fundamental 
transactions. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-501 (1985). Shareholders in 
closely-held corporations also frequently create an internal market for their shares 
by adopting deadlock and shareholder provisions requiring the corporation or its 
shareholders to purchase the shares of a dissident party at a price designed to ap-
proximate fair market value. Finally, a shareholder in a closely-held corporation 
can often successfully petition the courts to dissolve the corporation if their fellow 
shareholders. abuse their power. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 98. 
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Even when some market for his shares exists, a shareholder of a 
closed corporation cannot always avoid the impact of the new provisions 
cheaply. If, for example, the new rules favor the controlling sharehold-
ers, a dissenting shareholder, like his open corporation counterpart, can 
sell, if at all, only at price reflecting the new, presumably overreaching, 
provisions. Unlike his counterpart in an open corporation, however, he 
cannot rely on the possibility of a takeover to shore up the price he re-
ceives. Because no buyer can displace the incumbent control group and 
reap gain from reinstating the prior rules, the controlling group need not 
be timid in drafting overreaching charter provisions. 177 
Finally, unlike their counterparts in open corporations, shareholders 
of some closed corporations may find that they must bear the costs of 
mandatory rules even though they are unanimous in finding the new pro-
visions objectionable. 178 The local nature of their corporation's business 
and the prospect of paying franchise taxes to two states may render 
reincorporation elsewhere impracticable. 179 With reincorporation no 
longer an option, the shareholders of a closed corporation effectively 
have no choice but to tolerate the new provisions-an ironic twist given 
177. A controlling shareholder can be expected to impose rules which decrease the value 
of the corporation as a whole so long as the amount he personally gains from the 
redistributive effects of the rule exceed his pro-rata share of the loss suffered by the 
corporation. Such "redistribution" schemes are the basis of loyalty cases. Share-
holders have traditionally relied on the courts rather than the market to protect 
them from such self-serving behavior by controlling shareholders. See, e.g., MD. 
CORPS & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-413(b)(2) (1985) (empowering courts to order in-
voluntary dissolution of a corporation if a shareholder demonstrates that those in 
control of the corporation are oppressing shareholders). 
In addition, a controlling shareholder/manager may find his discretion to act 
opportunistically checked by the market for investment capital. If, for example, he 
anticipates attempting to raise additional capital by selling more shares, he may find 
that the adverse effect to his reputation of excessive self-dealing increases the costs 
of additional capital to the point at which the self-dealing behavior becomes unprof-
itable. 
For a criticism of the new Maryland provisions on the grounds that they inap-
propriately undercut the rigor of the duty of loyalty, see Sargent, supra note 5, at 
295-302; see also Zwier, supra note 5, at 375-77 (the new provisions inappropriately 
substitute an "arm's-length" flavor to corporate governance issues in place of the 
trust relation embodied in traditional loyalty rules). 
178. Of course, corporate participants do not always find mandatory rules objectionable. 
They may value such rules because they act as a bonding device to assure investors 
that no shareholder, or group of shareholders, can act opportunistically at a later 
date by imposing wealth-shifting rules. But see Gordon, supra note 144 (state codes 
are ineffective bonding devices). 
179. For example, shareholders of a relatively moderate-sized corporation might prefer 
the previous, less permissive indemnification rules. Yet the new indemnification 
provisions do not permit shareholders to opt back into those rules. Even if they 
could reincorporate in a state that permitted them that option, they would be re-
quired to pay a second round of organizational taxes as well as the usual Maryland 
fees as a cost of doing business within the state. See supra note 77. They would also 
be subject to multiple corporation and taxation filings as well. In many cases, the 
additional costs would be likely to exceed the benefits they derive from the preferred 
indemnification rules. 
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that the drafters nominally proposed to empower shareholders to fashion 
their own rules. 
In short, in contrast to shareholders of open corporations, share-
holders of closed corporations cannot exit easily at either the individual 
or the group level. Thus a contractarian cannot confidently infer consent 
from their decision to hold their shares. 18° For. that reason, a con-
tractarian could n·ot support the new provisions to the extent that they 
apply to closed corporations. 
VI. CRAFTING THE NEW PROVISIONS IN LIGHT OF THE 
CONTRACT MODEL 
If the drafters of the new rules wish to draw upon the Contract 
Model to support their efforts, they must amend the new provisions to 
ensure that they apply only to shareholders who explicitly or implicitly 
consent to whatever modification the provisions may make to their ex-
isting corporate contracts. Shareholders of open corporations present no 
problems; as noted above they may exit if they dissent. 181 Shareholders 
of closed corporations, however, present a problem precisely because 
they cannot exit easily. To make certain that the new provisions are not 
imposed on unwilling shareholders in closed corporations, the drafters 
must refashion the new rules to provide an opportunity for exit to share-
holders of closed corporations or, alternatively, the drafters must limit 
the application of the new provisions to open corporations only. 
One tack the drafters might take to resolve the consent problem is to 
provide dissenting shareholders in closed corporations with a method of 
exit by borrowing the concept of dissenters' rights from the laws gov-
erning fundamental transactions. 182 Recognizing, perhaps intuitively, 
the importance of providing a method of exit to shareholders who disa-
gree with fundamental changes in their corporations, legislators in all 
states, including Maryland, 183 provide protections to shareholders who 
object to certain proposed transactions. Dissenters' rights permit such 
shareholders to force the corporation to purchase their shares at their 
180. Of course, shareholders in such corporations do not leave themselves completely 
vulnerable to shirking and self-serving behavior by their fellow participants. As the 
cost of exit rises, shareholders turn more to voice-based rules for protection. Such 
voice-based rules will be found in employment contracts, shareholder agreements, 
and the corporate code. In nonpublicly traded corporations with many passive in-
vestors, one would expect to find more reliance on the standard form rules of the 
corporate code than one would find in closely held corporations. As reliance on the 
default rules of the corporate code increases, changes in such rules, like those 
brought about by the new Maryland provisions, become particularly important. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 171-174. 
182. For discussions of "dissenters' rights", see generally Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy 
in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B.F. REs. J. 875 (1983); Kanda & Levmore, The Ap-
praisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985); 
Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
L.J. 223 (1962). 
183. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -213 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
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"fair value" if the corporation engages in a specified transaction. 184 For 
example, although shareholders who dispute the wisdom of a proposed 
merger may not possess sufficient voting power to block the transaction, 
they may require the corporation to cash them out. 185 In return for their 
shares, they will receive the fair value of their shares, generally deter-
mined without taking into account the "halo effect" of the triggering 
event. 186 If that value can be accurately calculated, 187 and if denying the 
dissenting shareholder any share of the halo effect is fair, 188 a dissenting 
shareholder is given the choice of exit or continued investment in the 
corporation. Under those conditions, she cannot be said to have been 
forced to accept the merger decision of her peers. If she elects to hold 
her shares instead of exercising her dissenters' rights, she can be deemed 
to have consented to abide by the judgment of the shareholders who ap-
proved the transaction. 
The drafters of the new provisions might adapt Maryland's dissent-
ers' rights sections to provide the shareholders of closed corporations 
who oppose the application of the new provisions a method of exiting the 
corporation at a fair price. To do so the drafters first must offer the 
proposed governance changes to shareholders as a charter option. 
Although they have already structured liability-limiting provisions in 
that fashion, 189 they must revise the indemnification provisions if they 
are to be a charter option. 190 The drafters also must amend Maryland's 
184. See, e.g., id. § 3-202. 
185. See, e.g., id. § 3-202(a)(l). 
186. See, e.g., id. § 3-202(b). 
187. That "fair value" can be accurately determined is admittedly an heroic assumption. 
Valuing shares in a closed corporation is a particularly difficult, imprecise exercise. 
Courts, apparently concerned that dissenters are attempting to hold up the corpora-
tion for a premium, have generally employed conservative techniques which tend to 
undervalue shares. SeeR. CLARK, supra note 147, at 452-456. At best, "fair value" 
as determined by the courts is likely to approximate only roughly the true value of 
dissenter's shares. 
That fact, however, does not undercut entirely the utility of employing "dis-
senters' rights" to protect shareholders. The central question is whether the ap-
proach produces a less costly, fairer alternative. It might do so, particularly if the 
courts can be convinced to view dissenters as individuals who are simply exercising 
their contractual rights to resist modification of their deal. If the courts so viewed 
the appraisal remedy, they might improve their efforts at valuation. The Delaware 
courts, for example, have already taken a step in that direction. In Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court announced that 
it would no longer employ the standard "Delaware block" approach as the exclusive 
valuation technique for valuing shares in an appraisal proceeding. The Maryland 
Court of Appeals has declined to adopt Weinberger, at least in an action seeking a 
preliminary injunction. Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 511 A.2d 501 (1986); see 
also Walk v. Bait. & O.R.R., 847 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1988). 
188. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) (in some instances, dissenting shareholders ought to be 
permitted to share in the "halo effects"). For a discussion of the literature, see R. 
CLARK, supra note 147, at 472-478. 
189. See supra notes 29, 32-40 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra notes 30, 41-50 and accompanying text. 
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corporate code to provide dissenters' rights to shareholders who oppose 
charter amendments. 191 To avoid the problems which might arise if all 
charter amendments triggered the dissenter's rights provisions, the draft-
ers might make dissenters' rights available only with respect to specifi-
cally designated amendments-including amendments implementing the 
new liability and indemnification provisions. If they effected both 
changes, which would involve the difficult but essential task of formulat-
ing a workable but reasonably accurate method of ascertaining the fair 
value of a dissenter's shares, the drafters could credibly argue that share-
holders who choose not to exercise their dissenters' rights should be 
deemed to have consented to their fellow shareholders' implementation 
of the new provisions. 192 
A requirement that changes in the governance provisions be offered 
only on an opt-in basis, however, may be too expensive a solution. It 
would force shareholders in open corporations to meet to take advantage 
of the revisions. 193 Shareholder meetings are both expensive and time 
consuming, especially for open corporations that are subject to federal 
proxy regulation. 194 Given that the drafters formulated the new provi-
sions primarily to benefit the shareholders of open corporations, it would 
be ironic if the drafters were to impose substantial transaction costs on 
the shareholders of open corporations solely to render the new provisions 
191. The Maryland corporate code currently provides dissenters' rights in an amendment 
of the corporate charter only if the amendment alters the contract rights, as ex-
pressly set forth in the charter, of any outstanding stock and substantially adversely 
affects the shareholders' rights. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-202(a)(4) 
(Supp. 1988). The proposal in the text would significantly expand the availability of 
dissenters' rights when a corporation amends its charter. But see infra note 192 and 
accompanying text. 
192. The discussion in the text assumes that a dissenting shareholder can exercise her 
dissenters' rights cheaply, and that the value of her shares as determined in such 
proceedings is accurate. Neither is the case. First, valuing shares absent a market 
transaction is notoriously difficult. Second, exercising one's dissenter's rights is 
costly. If the procedure is sufficiently expensive or the valuation sufficiently low, 
shareholders might retain their shares because they find it cheaper simply to bear 
the loss caused by the new rules than to pursue their dissenters' rights alternative. 
Under such conditions, holding one's shares cannot be deemed to be evidence of 
consent. 
193. So long as the Maryland code retains the market exception to its dissenter's rights 
provision, those open corporations whose shares are listed on a national securities 
exchange would not need to offer dissenter's rights to their shareholders; dissenters 
would be forced to sell their shares on the market. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE 
ANN. § 3-202(c) (Supp. 1988). Of course, not all corporations subject to the market 
exception are open corporations, as many have control blocks of sufficient size to 
defuse the market for control. The drafters would need to tighten the exception so 
that it applied only to open corporations. For a discussion of the market exception, 
which originated in Delaware in 1967, see E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE 
CORPORATION LAW FOR THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW REVISIONS COM-
MITTEE 1965-1967, at 196-200. For a defense of the market exception, see Selig-
man, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 829, 266 (1985). 
But see M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION-A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 80-84 (1976). 
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). 
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acceptable to the shareholders of closed corporations. Drafters ought 
not to impose transaction costs on shareholders simply to maintain theo-
retical purity. 195 
Rather than amending the new provisions so as to make them unob-
jectionable to the shareholders of all corporations, the drafters might find 
it preferable to apply the new liability-limiting and indemnification provi-
sions only to open corporations. As previously noted, they could justify 
doing so because the new rules come into play primarily in hostile take-
over battles. 196 Those contests are almost exclusively an· open corpora-
tion phenomenon. Moreover, in open corporations, fiduciary duties 
(particularly the duty of care) play a relatively minor role in disciplining 
corporate directors and officers. Shareholders in those corporations tend 
to rely primarily on market forces to discipline managers; they usually 
find voice rules too expensive because they can be enforced only through 
litigation or at least the threat of litigation. 197 If the new rules were ap-
plied only to open corporations, the drafters could reduce transaction 
costs substantially by offering the new provisions to shareholders of open 
corporations as an "opt-out" option. That is, they could impose the new 
provisions as the code's default terms, yet permit those corporations 
whose shareholders preferred the prior rules to amend their organic doc-
uments to reimpose the prior regime. By this approach, the drafters 
would compel the shareholders of only a few corporations to bear the 
expense of meeting to amend their charter. The shareholders of most 
corporations would benefit from the new provisions without the need to 
act at all. 198 
Finally, if the drafters believe that some variation of the new provi-
sions is appropriate for all corporations, they might opt for a combina-
tion of the options described above. For example, they could create a 
special title of the corporations code that would be available only to cor-
porations which qualify as open corporations. 199 The drafters would be 
195. Though the drafters of the new provisions conditioned the availability of the liability 
limiting rules upon shareholder approval of charter provisions, they might have 
done so only because they realized that the new indemnification provisions permit 
the board to achieve the same result on a case-by-case basis. See supra notes 105-
120 and accompanying text. They might have believed that the expense entailed in 
requiring a corporation to modify its charter to limit director and officer liability 
was tolerable only so long as directors could grant indemnification without engaging 
in costly shareholder action. 
196. See supra notes 22-23, 52-54 and accompanying text. 
197. See Manne, Two Systems, supra note 130. 
198. Under such a system, management need not even disclose the new provisions to 
shareholders at the corporation's next annual meeting. 
199. Such a subchapter would be structured somewhat like the existing chapter for 
"close corporations." See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 
(1985 & Supp. 1988). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recently tested, but ap-
parently abandoned, the possibility of creating a special set of rules for open-like 
corporations. In 1985, the Pennsylvania Senate considered a bill which, in amend-
ing that state's corporate code, inter alia, would have added special "registered cor-
poration" provisions. Ultimately no action was taken on the bill. For a complete 
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required to delineate the qualifications for eligibility for open corporation 
status. For example, they might determine that an "open corporation" is 
one whose shares are "publicly traded" (defined perhaps as being traded 
on a national securities exchange, or in terms of average ftoat), 200 and in 
which no shareholder, or group of shareholders, may own control of the 
corporation. Because Maryland continues to follow the old two-thirds 
rule in shareholder voting,201 it would be appropriate to define "control" 
as ownership of shares possessing more than one-third of the voting 
power to be cast on resolutions to amend the corporation's charter. 
Shareholders of eligible corporations could elect open corporation status 
by including such an election in their initial articles or by amending their 
existing articles. 202 To ensure that no shareholder would be locked into 
an open corporation or be forced to sell in a market made skittish by the 
election, shareholders who dissent to the election should be granted dis-
senters' rights. 203 Once a corporation is designated an open corporation, 
its shareholders could further amend their charter to "opt-out" of newly 
enacted governance rules without providing dissenters' rights. 204 In ef-
fect, election of open corporation status would be tantamount to share-
holder approval of a blank-check charter.205 Finally, the drafters might 
make the changes in governance rules available to shareholders of closed 
corporations on an "opt-in" basis only. Again, dissatisfied shareholders 
would be granted dissenters' rights. 206 
If the drafters provided for a system combining the "closed corpora-
discussion of the proposed Pennsylvania legislation, see Porrata-Doria, · The Pro-
posed Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law: A Horse Designed By Committee, 59 
TEMP. L. Q. 437 (1986). 
200. The Maryland General Corporations Law already makes a somewhat similar dis-
tinction in its "Fair Price" legislation. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-
202, 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1988). That legislation, the prototype for "fair 
price" anti-takeover legislation, is not applicable to corporations having fewer than 
100 beneficial owners of stock. /d. § 3-603(e)(ii). 
201. /d. §§ 2-604(d), 3-l05(d). 
202. Cf id. §§ 4-101, 4-201. 
203. For a discussion of dissenters' rights, see supra notes 182-188 and accompanying 
text. 
204. The significant benefit of the separate, elective open corporation title is that it per-
mits the General Assembly to avoid the definite line-drawing task of defining "open 
corporation." It must be recognized, however, that if shareholders of existing cor- , 
porations must amend their corporate charters to elect "open corporation" status, 
they will incur the same transactions costs in doing so that they would incur in 
opting into a new set of rules. But they would incur those costs only once. After 
electing "open corporation" status, they could subject themselves to future rule 
changes without the need for shareholder votes. 
205. As noted earlier, some consensualists maintain that "opting in" or "opting out" 
charter provisions should be deemed valid only if they are adopted in the initial 
chartering of the corporation; mid-stream amendments of the charter create the 
potential for opportunistic modification. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 144, at 39-60. 
It is unclear how such critics would respond to a proposal permitting shareholders 
to enact the type of "blank check" charter proposed here. 
206. For a discussion of dissenters' rights, see supra notes 182-188 and accompanying 
text. 
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tion/opt-in/dissenters' rights" pattern and the "open corporations/opt-
out/no dissenters' rights" pattern, they could make the new provisions 
available to shareholders of all corporations in a way that minimizes 
transactions costs, especially for open corporations. At the same time, 
they could ensure that shareholders affected by governance changes con-
tinue to hold their shares because they approve of them, and not because 
they lack a financially feasible alternative. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It appears that the drafters of the new liability-limiting and indemni-
fication provisions amended the Maryland corporation code primarily to 
permit directors and officers of Maryland's open corporations to react to 
takeover bids and restructuring needs without the fear of incurring per-
sonal liability. In formulating the new provisions, they offered several 
rationales as justifications. In the final analysis, none-not even the 
shareholder empowerment justification--can support the new provisions 
in their entirety. In the main, however, the application of the new provi-
sions-whatever their economic wisdom-to open corporations can be 
justified as an application of the contract model of the corporation. 
Shareholders who disagree can exit relatively easily and inexpensively by 
selling their shares on the market. 
Following the well-established pattern of applying identical govern-
ance rules to all corporations, however, the drafters crafted the. new pro-
visions so that they apply to closed corporations as well as to open ones. 
Yet, because the shareholders of such corporations have no ready market 
for their shares, they-unlike their counterparts in· open corporations-
cannot be deemed to have consented to the new provisions simply be-
cause they continue to hold their shares. Shareholders in closed corpora-
tions may choose to hold rather than sell simply to minimize their loss. 
The Contract Model provides no support for forcing shareholders to ac-
cept losses which the drafters of reform legislation deem worthwhile. 
To the extent that drafters seek the support of the Contract Model 
to justify their efforts, they must amend the recent legislation to assure 
that the new provisions are not imposed on unwilling shareholders. The 
drafters could cure their error by limiting the application of the govern-
ance provisions to open corporations only, or by providing an exit for 
shareholders of closed corporations· who object to modification of their 
corporate contract. If they do so, drafters need not be shy about altering 
rules. They can permit shareholders the widest latitude possible. Until 
they refashion the provisions, however, the drafters should expect to find 
their efforts criticized by both traditionalists and contractarians. 
